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Cumulative constitutional rights are ubiquitous. Plaintiffs litigate multiple
constitutional violations, or multiple harms, and judges use multiple
constitutional provisions to inform interpretation. Yet judges, litigants, and
scholars have often criticized the notion of cumulative rights, including in
leading Supreme Court rulings, such as Lawrence v. Texas, Employment
Division v. Smith, and Miranda v. Arizona. Recently, the Court attempted to
clarify some of this confusion. In its landmark opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,
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the Court struck down state bans on same-sex marriage by pointing to several
distinct but overlapping protections inherent in the Due Process Clause,
including the right to individual autonomy, the right to intimate association, and
the safeguarding of children, while also noting how the rights in question were
simultaneously grounded in equal protection. “The Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way,” Justice Kennedy
wrote. The Court did not, however, explain the connection. To redress harms to
injured plaintiffs without creating doctrinal incoherence, courts need to
understand the categorically distinct ways in which cumulative constitutional
harm can occur and how these forms affect constitutional scrutiny. We argue
that cumulative constitutional rights cases can be categorized into three general
types and that these types need to be analyzed differently. The first type,
aggregate harm, occurs when multiple discrete acts, taken together, add up to a
harm of constitutional magnitude, even if each individual act, taken alone, would
not. The second type, hybrid rights, occurs where a plaintiff claims a single
action has violated rights under multiple constitutional provisions. If a court
were to apply the proper level of scrutiny to the claims individually, however,
none would result in redress. As a result, hybrid rights cases should not
ordinarily result in relief. The third type, intersectional rights, occur when the
action violates more than one constitutional provision but only results in relief
when the provisions are read to inform and bolster one another. Our aim in this
Article is to provide a framework courts can use to analyze cumulative
constitutional rights. While courts should be open to conducting a cumulative
analysis, when constitutional rights are mutually reinforcing those relationships
should be clearly set out and defined.
INTRODUCTION
It would be convenient if all constitutional cases were straightforward: a
plaintiff complains that a single constitutional right has been violated by a single
action. Life, however, is messy, and so is constitutional law. Often a plaintiff’s
claim is complex. Perhaps several discrete acts, taken together, have violated a
constitutional right. Or perhaps a single act violated multiple constitutional
provisions. In some cases, the harm alleged may not result in relief without
considering the interplay of various constitutional provisions. All of these
instances are examples of the litigation of what we term “cumulative
constitutional rights.”
Cumulative constitutional rights cases are everywhere, although they often go
unnoticed as such. The right to a fair trial, for example, can be violated through
a series of interrelated but separate, seemingly minor procedural irregularities.
Sometimes activity that could be described as the free exercise of religion is also
free speech or freedom of association. Litigants raising First Amendment or
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claims also routinely assert a
due process violation concerning the arbitrary denial of the underlying right.
Indeed, many of the Supreme Court’s most famous rulings, ranging from the
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free exercise case Employment Division v. Smith1 to the criminal procedure case
Miranda v. Arizona2 to the sexual liberty case Lawrence v. Texas,3 are cases
concerning cumulative constitutional harm.4
Despite their ubiquity, these cases are widely criticized and maligned as
doctrinally incoherent. Scholars have critiqued the cases in formalist terms,
cautioning that the Court should be more careful to distinguish between specific
rights and to avoid blurring the lines between rights.5 And judges, including
some Supreme Court Justices, have proven wary of arguments about cumulative
rights. Even when the Supreme Court appears to be engaging in a cumulative
rights analysis, lower courts often attempt to disaggregate the rights when
applying the precedent to new cases.6 To many, decisions involving cumulative
constitutional harm seem outrageous, arbitrary, or even lawless, and, at
minimum, not to be taken seriously.7
The critics are not entirely wrong. After all, a cumulative approach could
result in the paradox that a weak claim brought under a single constitutional
provision would be denied relief, but the same weak claim would be granted
relief if it could be pled using two constitutional provisions rather than just one.
Commentators have thus characterized cumulative claims as creating a “twofor-one sale” where “two losers equal one winner.”8 In particular, scholars have

1

494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
384 U.S. 436, 510 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
4 See infra Part II discussing Smith and infra Part III discussing Lawrence and Miranda.
5 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lecture, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The Interlocking Gears
of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 588, 591 (2015) (explaining that Justice
Kennedy “blurs the lines between federalism, liberty, and equality, and he blurs the lines
between structure and rights” in his Windsor opinion).
6 See, e.g., Megan Backer, Comment, Giving Lawrence Its Due: How the Eleventh Circuit
Underestimated the Due Process Implications of Lawrence v. Texas in Lofton v. Secretary of
The Department of Children & Family Services, 90 MINN. L. REV. 745, 745-46 (2006); see
also infra Part I (discussing the failure of lower courts to properly apply cumulative rights
doctrine in criminal procedure cases).
7 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121-22 (1990) (arguing that “the Smith Court’s notion of ‘hybrid’
claims was not intended to be taken seriously,” and instead “was created for the sole purpose”
of distinguishing prior precedent); Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the
Fall: The Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 930 (1998) (“There
is . . . the question of why it should matter that a claim implicates more than one fundamental
right, as if the Constitution were limited to two-for-one sales.”). For a backhanded defense of
Justice Kennedy’s approach in Windsor as “mad genius,” and as not just combining “equality
and liberty” “seemingly willy-nilly” but also applying “the principles of federalism,” and
therefore “pairing rights and structure,” see Gerken, supra note 5, at 591.
8 William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus
or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 211, 219 (1998); see also Smolla,
supra note 7, at 930.
2
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criticized much of the Court’s constitutional family jurisprudence—from the
contraception cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut9 and Eisenstadt v. Baird10
to the more recent LGBT rights cases such as Lawrence and United States v.
Windsor11—for failing to specify with adequate precision the constitutional right
at stake.12
Recently, the Supreme Court made an attempt to clarify some of this
confusion. In its opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges,13 the Court struck down state
bans on same-sex marriage by pointing to several distinct but overlapping
protections inherent in the Due Process Clause, including the right to individual
autonomy, the right to intimate association, and the safeguarding of children.14
And although Justice Kennedy’s opinion focused primarily on due process, it
also acknowledged that the rights in question were simultaneously grounded in
equal protection. “The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are
connected in a profound way,” Justice Kennedy wrote.15 “In any particular case
one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate
and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the
identification and definition of the right.”16 In Obergefell, the Court has more
definitively made the link between equal protection and due process that
commentators have observed for decades.17
Although Obergefell gestures in the right direction, we believe that a clearer
framework is necessary to give guidance to lower courts about how and when
cumulative constitutional analysis is conducted. Obergefell itself does not go

9

381 U.S. 479, 483 (1964).
405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1971).
11 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013).
12 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on
the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1174
(1988) (arguing that, “[s]ince its inception, the Equal Protection Clause has served an entirely
different set of purposes from the Due Process Clause”).
13 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
14 Id. at 2599-600.
15 Id. at 2603.
16 Id.
17 See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Equality and Unconstitutional Discrimination, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 51, 51-53 (Deborah Hellman &
Sophia Moreau eds., 2013) (arguing that two approaches to discrimination, as a violation of
equality and a violation of liberty, undergird American constitutional law); Kenneth L. Karst,
The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99,
136-37 (2007) (developing connection between equal protection and due process rights); Julie
A. Nice, Equal Protection’s Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive Approach, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1392, 1404 n.9 (2000) (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to the states . . . and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
includes an equal protection component that applies to the federal government.”); Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 776-87 (2011) (discussing
liberty-based dignity arguments).
10
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nearly far enough to explain how the violation of equal protection combined
with multiple facets of substantive due process protection leads to heightened
scrutiny of the challenged law. In addition, Obergefell concerned a particular
type of cumulative constitutional harm, so the opinion is unhelpful for evaluating
other types, such as where a criminal defendant suffers from multiple violations
of procedural due process rights.
Our aim in this Article is to provide a framework that courts can use to analyze
claims involving cumulative constitutional rights. These claims pervade
constitutional law, so courts have no choice but to deal with them. But in order
to redress harms to injured plaintiffs without creating doctrinal incoherence,
courts need to understand the categorically distinct ways in which cumulative
constitutional rights cases can arise and understand how these different forms
affect constitutional scrutiny.
We argue that cumulative constitutional rights cases can be categorized into
three general types, and that these types need to be analyzed differently by
courts. The first type, aggregate harm cases, occur when multiple discrete acts,
taken together, add up to a harm of constitutional magnitude, even if each
individual act, taken alone, would not, or would not be sufficient to obtain a
constitutional remedy. The second type, hybrid rights, occurs where a plaintiff
claims that a single action has violated her rights under multiple constitutional
provisions. If a court were to apply the proper level of scrutiny to her claims
individually, however, none would result in redress. She therefore argues that
the existence of partial violations of multiple constitutional provisions should be
added together. The third type, intersectional rights, occurs when the action in
question violates more than one constitutional provision and when the
constitutional provisions are read to inform and bolster one another, as in
Obergefell.18 Violations of intersectional rights might be difficult to understand

18 This concept is similar to Pamela Karlan’s idea of “stereoscopic” rights, although we
argue that the category goes beyond the equal protection-due process scenarios in which she
applies it. See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) (“[T]his essay suggests that
sometimes looking at an issue stereoscopically—through the lenses of both the due process
clause and the equal protection clause—can have synergistic effects, producing results that
neither clause might reach by itself.”). The problem that we engage with is the same problem
that David Faigman explored in two pieces in the 1990s, asking whether the ultimate question
should be whether the entire, relevant “transaction” is unconstitutional. See David L.
Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
641, 643 (1994) (“Madisonian Balancing begins with the premise that a constitutional injury
caused by some government action cannot be described in a piecemeal fashion.”); David L.
Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 755 (1994)
(“The government’s justification for infringements of individual liberty should be measured
on a transactional basis rather than, as is now done, on an amendment-by-amendment basis.”).
Faigman described a burden-shifting scheme to weigh aggregate constitutional harm in
litigation; we do not address such issues, outside the area we describe as aggregate harm cases
in which we find such an approach most useful, but instead focus on distinguishing among

1314

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:1309

when presented as two separate violations, but when presented together, they
come into focus as problems of constitutional magnitude. We argue that each of
these circumstances calls for a different legal analysis and that courts sometimes
fail to distinguish adequately between the three, thus engaging in the wrong
analysis (or no analysis at all) and coming to the wrong result.
We contend that when considering cases involving the first category,
aggregate harm, courts must hear evidence of multiple acts because many
instances of constitutional harm occur in this manner—the harm comes in the
form of “death by a thousand cuts” rather than a single blow. In the second
category, hybrid rights, we argue that multiple constitutional violations might
alert a court to particularly troubling behavior, but that two half violations do
not make a whole: the court needs to actually find a violation of at least one
constitutional right in order to grant relief. Finally, as to the third category,
intersectional rights, we endorse Justice Kennedy’s approach in Obergefell,
which reads equal protection and due process as mutually reinforcing.
We critique Justice Kennedy’s opinion, however, because we believe that in
order to provide clarity and to keep “new” constitutional rights from blooming
on every tree, these rights must be more clearly tethered to the relevant standard
for establishing relief.19 Once a court has established that harm has occurred
through the violation of intersectional rights, it should then apply the appropriate
standard to determine whether the harm suffered is justifiable. In Obergefell—
which forwent analysis of the applicable tiers of scrutiny—the analysis may
have been unnecessary, as the statutes in question would have failed
intermediate scrutiny and likely even rational basis review; but that will not
always be true. The Court’s failure in Obergefell (as in prior decisions like
Windsor and Lawrence) to provide guidance to subsequent courts about the
appropriate standard of review or level of scrutiny may plague LGBT rights
litigation for years to come. The problem we see with the opinion, however, lies
in this particular failure of specificity, not in its blending of constitutional rights.
In other cases, such as Miranda and many others lying outside of equal
types of interactions between constitutional rights. Finally, Michael Coenen has recently
described how there are advantages and disadvantages to types of “combination analysis” of
constitutional rights, including as to structural provisions that are beyond the scope of this
Article. Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1068
(2016) (“In all of these cases, the Court has embraced (or at least tinkered with) forms of what
I call ‘combination analysis’—justifying judicial outcomes by reference to multiple clauses
acting together, as opposed to individual clauses acting alone.”). We discuss some of the
“combination errors” and categories of useful “combination analysis” that Coenen identifies,
and add some of our own. We share Coenen’s broad goal to encourage but also better guide
the uses of cumulative constitutional analysis.
19 While it may help to add precision to explain constitutional analysis with reference to
the traditional tiers of scrutiny, we do not suggest that all of the leading cases can be explained
using those tiers, or that the use of such tiers is always the best way to screen for
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See infra Section III.B for a
discussion of these issues.
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protection doctrine, the Court developed an entirely new constitutional test that
is informed by multiple constitutional sources. In such cases, the appropriate
level of review can be set out when defining the new constitutional standard, but
it is important to specify the degree to which that new standard should be
informed by each of its constitutive sources.20
One implication of our categorization is that courts must be careful to choose
the right category and remain attentive to situations in which multiple categories
might be operating. A criminal defendant claiming that a right to a fair trial was
violated, for example, might also have a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel. For each claim, there might be multiple pieces of evidence, and for each
claim, the doctrine requires that there be a harmless-error type analysis
permitting relief only if the violations reasonably prejudiced the fairness of the
entire trial. Under our framework, the court should aggregate the evidence and
determine whether, taken together, the separate constitutional violations
reasonably prejudiced the entire trial. This would be an aggregate harm analysis.
Second, if there is not enough evidence for either constitutional claim, then the
court would need to determine whether this was a hybrid rights or an
intersectional rights case. If it is a hybrid rights case, then two partial harms
don’t lead to a constitutional violation—they are just two separate, unsuccessful
claims. But if instead it is an intersectional rights case—one involving rights
that, when read together, magnify each other—then the right to a fair trial and
the right to effective assistance of counsel are mutually reinforcing and
amplifying, and there could be a constitutional violation based on the totality of
the circumstances even if neither right was violated on its own.
In the case of the right to a fair trial and the specific right to effective
assistance of counsel, one right is more specific and one more general, but they
do not amplify each other. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim is a subset
of the fair trial claim. In contrast, the third category of intersectional rights could
be implicated if a distinct violation implicating another constitutional right
occurred which magnified the ineffective assistance or fair trial claim. Consider,
for example, a claim that a individual was being singled out for an unfair trial
due to ethnicity or religious beliefs. The existence of free exercise,
establishment, or equal protection concerns could amplify the harm resulting
from the failure to use fair procedures in a trial, even if the unfairness of these
procedures, standing alone, would not create a cognizable constitutional harm.
Dismissing an “intersectional rights” case as a mere “hybrid rights” case would
lead a court to undervalue the severity of the harm suffered by the plaintiff.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the simplest category of
cumulative constitutional rights: the aggregate harm cases. It shows how some
courts have developed a doctrine of aggregate harm and how some courts have

20

Our theory is distinct from Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai’s expert illumination of
“constitutional borrowing,” in which a court borrows a standard from one area of
constitutional law for use in another. See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional
Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 460 (2010).
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resisted recognizing it. We argue that courts must recognize this type of harm or
they will fail to protect the constitutional rights of litigants. To make this point,
we consider the paradigm example of criminal defendants entitled to a fair trial
and demonstrate how several constitutional claims can all potentially contribute
to the same fair trial harm.
Part II explores the hybrid rights cases. We show why these cases have
seemed doctrinally muddled. If a constitutional right has not been violated, it
shouldn’t matter that other constitutional rights have not been violated, either.
We argue that allegations of multiple constitutional violations should serve as a
warning to courts of potentially serious violations, but that they should not be
added together unless they can be described fairly as intersectional.
Part III turns to the intersectional rights cases, including Obergefell. Here, we
argue that the Court has repeatedly recognized that due process, equal
protection, freedom of association, freedom of speech, free exercise, and other
constitutional protections are overlapping and interrelated. The distinct situation
in which a new constitutional standard is informed by multiple constitutional
provisions is surprisingly common. However, many courts have failed to
recognize intersectionality, and perversely see the inclusion of multiple rights
claims as a weakness. Many constitutional violations, however, may only be
remedied when these individual provisions are considered in tandem. Although
the cases in which the Court has done this have been maligned, we argue that
the criticism of these cases is often too formalist and misses the animating
purpose behind these constitutional provisions.
I.

AGGREGATE HARM

The first category of cumulative constitutional cases we identify are the cases
we label “aggregate harm” cases. These cases are most commonly found in the
world of criminal procedure, where there is open consideration of whether
multiple constitutional violations, taken together, merit a remedy, even where
each individual violation standing alone would not suffice. For example, the
cumulative error doctrine arises chiefly during postconviction review of a
criminal conviction. At this stage, a court considers whether any error might be
harmless, and as a result, the question is whether to provide the remedy of a new
trial where two constitutional violations that independently would lack a remedy
under harmless error might jointly lead to a remedy. Frequently, a habeas
petitioner will allege a range of violations, some distinct violations of the same
right and some of different rights, in order to challenge a criminal conviction.
The Supreme Court recognizes that cumulative harm is a helpful framework for
sorting out such difficult problems.
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A. Cumulative Harmless Error
Cumulative harmless error analysis in constitutional criminal procedure
originated in the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. Kentucky.21 There, the
Court held that even though the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the
presumption of innocence, the “skeletal instructions” alone did not necessarily
violate the Constitution.22 However, the prosecutor had also committed
borderline misconduct in closing arguments, leading to additional “potentially
dangerous circumstances.”23 The Court ruled that the combination of these
errors violated the Due Process Clause’s guarantee of fundamental fairness due
to their “cumulative effect.”24
Thus, the analysis focused on the cumulative harm, not because single
violations would otherwise be harmless, but because fundamental fairness at
trial is only implicated when constitutional harm is serious, and the cumulative
nature of the error in Taylor resulted in serious harm at the trial taken as a whole,
even if one error related to closing arguments, and another related to jury
instructions. One reason this doctrine has developed in the criminal procedure
context is because trials are complex events. For example, it is quite common
for a habeas petition to point to a range of deficiencies of the defense lawyer at
trial as violating the Sixth Amendment. It is not generally considered a
cumulative error analysis (which instead typically refers to consideration of
different types of constitutional criminal procedure theories) to look to see
whether each of the separate denoted “claims” of allegedly unconstitutional
attorney ineffectiveness added up to a prejudicial and constitutionally deficient
trial. However, in addition, multiple constitutional rights may apply to all or part
of the criminal trial. Many of the rights implicate to one degree or another the
due process requirement that the entire trial be fundamentally fair, but some
rights also implicate specific Bill of Rights provisions. While Taylor involved
two different types of due process violations, what of the situation where it is a
general fair trial claim concerning prosecutorial misconduct, but also a specific
claim concerning a confession, under the Fifth Amendment, or some other more
specific constitutional provision?

21 436 U.S. 478, 487 n.15 (1978) (“Because of our conclusion that the cumulative effect
of the potentially damaging circumstances of this case violated the due process guarantee of
fundamental fairness in the absence of an instruction as to the presumption of innocence, we
do not reach petitioner’s further claim that the refusal to instruct that an indictment is not
evidence independently constituted reversible error.”).
22 Id. at 487-88.
23 Id. at 487 n.15.
24 Id. at 487-88 & n.15.
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B. Cumulative Prejudice Under Strickland and Brady
Notions of cumulative harm underlie one of the most important and frequently
litigated criminal procedure doctrines—the Strickland v. Washington25 standard
governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.26 Under Strickland, courts
ask not whether each individual act or decision by a defendant’s counsel was
deficient, but instead whether all of the lawyer’s errors, taken together,
amounted to a constitutionally deficient performance.27 In turn, Strickland
claims rely on not one but two constitutional interests: the Sixth Amendment,
which guarantees the right to counsel in criminal cases, as well as the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees a fair trial.28 This
area also involves a straightforward example of the first category of cumulative
constitutional rights: aggregation. The aggregation of incidents of conduct when
litigating Strickland claims has not been controversial. Instead this has been
understood as reflective of the cumulative nature of ineffective lawyering at
various stages of a criminal case: during the course of investigation, plea
negotiations, trial, or appeal.29 A single act by a lawyer cannot be seen in
isolation; the failure to cross-examine a witness may not be significant, but the
failure to respond by calling a rebuttal alibi witness may be devastating. To be
sure, not all courts fully understand this function of Strickland. For example, two
Circuits have rejected cumulation of attorney errors to determine prejudice under
Strickland, oddly treating separate attorney errors as separate “claims” when
they are all instances of attorney ineffectiveness.30
Strickland claims are also “umbrella” claims in another way, providing a
separate vehicle to litigate other constitutional rights. They ask whether the

25

466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Id. at 684.
27 Id. at 695 (“In making this determination, a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must
consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.”).
28 Id. at 682 (holding that “the defendant must show that counsel’s errors” resulted in
“prejudice”).
29 For more on cumulative analysis of Strickland claims, see Ruth A. Moyer, To Err Is
Human; To Cumulate, Judicious: The Need for U.S. Supreme Court Guidance on Whether
Federal Habeas Courts Reviewing State Convictions May Cumulatively Assess Strickland
Errors, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 447, 452 (2013). For rulings emphasizing the importance of
investigating mitigating evidence to prepare for the sentencing phase of a capital trial, see, for
example, Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380-81 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
522-27 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393 (2000). For rulings recognizing that
ineffective assistance of counsel may be asserted regarding plea negotiations, see, for
example, Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376,
1384 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2010).
30 Moyer, supra note 29, at 472-77 (describing how the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth
and Eighth Circuits reject cumulation of Strickland errors, and the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the issue); see also Pryor v. Norris, 103 F.3d 710, 714 (8th
Cir. 1997).
26
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counsel’s performance affected the trial, thus the inquiry can also include the
situation in which counsel failed to adequately investigate, assert, or vindicate
another constitutional right. Indeed, a Strickland claim can provide a vehicle to
assert, for example, a constitutional right that would have otherwise been waived
or, in the case of Fourth Amendment claims, that cannot be presented during
federal habeas corpus review.31 Of course, all rights incorporated under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are rights that are litigated using
the Due Process Clause as the procedural vehicle. Our focus, however, is on the
joint interpretation of constitutional rights. To the extent that the Due Process
Clause not only incorporates rights but also influences their development,
however, the subject is one and the same.
The cumulative theory of constitutional harm lies at the center of criminal
postconviction litigation. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are far and
away the most commonly litigated postconviction claims through federal habeas
petitions.32
Similarly, the Supreme Court has emphasized in the context of prosecutorial
misconduct that multiple violations of the Brady v. Maryland33 rule—that the
prosecution disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant—have a cumulative
effect. Thus, the Court has found that prosecutors have violated defendants’ due
process rights by suppressing exculpatory evidence in cases involving many
small incidents of prosecutorial misconduct, each of which might not have been
enough on its own to be a constitutional violation.34 Instead of asking whether
each piece of evidence suppressed led to an unfair trial, courts must ask whether
all of the conduct taken together “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make
the conviction a denial of due process.”35 Similarly, errors of state law may

31 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) (“[A] good Fourth Amendment
claim alone will not earn a prisoner federal habeas relief. Only those habeas petitioners who
can prove under Strickland that they have been denied a fair trial by the gross incompetence
of their attorneys will be granted the writ . . . .”).
32 See NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE
PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 28
(2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB3TJXBD] (finding in empirical study of habeas filings that eighty-one percent of the capital cases
included an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King,
Essay, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791, 811
(2009).
33 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (“We agree with the Court of Appeals that suppression of this
confession was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
34 See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995) (examining materiality by
looking to the “the cumulative effect of suppression”).
35 Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,
416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
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violate the constitution if they “so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny
due process of law.”36
Recognition of cumulative harm, then, is alive and well in criminal procedure
doctrine. Even here, however, courts are skeptical, and the doctrine has not
always resulted in the far-reaching remedies that it might. In response to Taylor,
for example, all circuits apply some version of a cumulative harm claim, but the
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have largely dismantled the
doctrine.37 The chief fear expressed by judges on these courts is that cumulative
error provides an “infinitely expandable concept.”38 Few habeas petitioners have
received reversals under a cumulative error theory.39 Moreover, there are few

36

Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 228 (1941).
See Hall v. Luebbers, 296 F.3d 685, 692 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[A] habeas petitioner cannot
build a showing of prejudice on a series of errors, none of which would by itself meet the
prejudice test.”); United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 532 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing
cumulative harm doctrine in the context of plain error); Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 824
(7th Cir. 2000) (“To prevent the synergistic effect of these errors from escaping review, courts
attempt to determine whether the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”); United States
v. Ward, 190 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Ashworth, 836 F.2d 260,
267 (6th Cir. 1988)) (“[E]rrors that might not be prejudicial when viewed alone, may together
produce a fundamentally unfair trial.”); United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir.
1995) (describing cumulative harm doctrine); United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 547 n.17
(3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1195-96 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Individual
errors, insufficient in themselves to necessitate a new trial, may in the aggregate have a more
debilitating effect.”); United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (“A
cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates all the errors that individually have been found
to be harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect
on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be
harmless.”); United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Even if each of
these errors, by itself, is arguably harmless, their cumulative effect may well be prejudicial.”);
United States v. Canales, 744 F.2d 413, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jones, 482
F.2d 747, 749-50 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (“This court has indicated that although certain errors
standing alone might be insufficient to overturn a verdict, these errors may exert a cumulative
effect such as to warrant reversal.”). Further, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has in
dicta suggested the doctrine might not apply across various types of claims. See Lorraine v.
Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 447 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The Supreme Court has not held that distinct
constitutional claims can be cumulated to grant habeas relief.”).
38 Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1457 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“[A]n error that
would not have risen to constitutional dimension by itself might suddenly, when aggregated
with other non-constitutional errors, become worthy of habeas relief.”); Rachel A. Van
Cleave, When Is an Error Not an “Error”? Habeas Corpus and Cumulative Error Analysis,
46 BAYLOR L. REV. 59, 85 (1994).
39 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1462 (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (calling cumulative error
analysis “quite narrow—as evidenced by the majority’s inability to locate more than two
instances from our thousands of habeas cases in which a state petitioner has succeeded with
the argument”). Courts also often focus on the strength of government evidence to hold that
cumulative errors did not prejudice the trial. See, e.g., United States v. Ollivierre, 378 F.3d
37
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examples of courts granting relief and specifically stating that they would not
have done so absent cumulative error.40
In cumulative error analysis, courts will only consider accumulating errors if
each can independently be considered an error.41 Some courts go further to
impose additional limitations on the doctrine. For example, the Fifth Circuit will
only accumulate procedurally preserved and prejudicial errors under cumulative
error analysis.42 Because those errors are already prejudicial, the cumulative
error analysis adds nothing to the result. Courts have also refused to apply the
doctrine because the defendant failed to raise the issue in either the federal
district or state court.43 These decisions are totally misplaced. The cumulative
error doctrine is not itself a constitutional claim that must be exhausted or
waived, but rather a theory for how to evaluate whether to provide a remedy.
Thus, while some courts agree that “[i]ndividual efforts, insufficient in
themselves to necessitate a new trial, may in the aggregate have a more
debilitating effect,”44 the cumulative harm doctrine has not been adequately

412, 422 (4th Cir. 2004); Darks v. Mullin, 327 F.3d 1001, 1018-19 (10th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Meserve, 271 F.3d 314, 332 (1st Cir. 2001) (comparing the strength of the
Government’s case against the errors complained of by defendant); United States v. Adams,
74 F.3d 1093, 1099-100 (11th Cir. 1996); Copple, 24 F.3d at 547 n.17; Jones, 482 F.2d at
754-55 (listing particular errors and finding them “harmless in a cumulative sense”).
40 United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1237 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A cumulative error
analysis aggregates all the errors that individually might be harmless.”); Harris v. Wood, 64
F.3d 1432, 1439 (9th Cir. 1995) (“By finding cumulative prejudice, we obviate the need to
analyze the individual prejudicial effect of each deficiency.”); United States v. Parker, 997
F.2d 219, 222 (6th Cir. 1993) (“The combined effect of these four errors was so prejudicial
as to strike at the fundamental fairness of the trial.”); United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d
1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1993) (“In reviewing for cumulative error, the court must review all
errors preserved for appeal and all plain errors.”).
41 Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 F.3d 820, 825 (7th Cir. 2000); Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086,
1113 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Cumulative error analysis applies where there are two or more actual
errors; it does not apply to the cumulative effect of non-errors.”); United States v. Rogers, 89
F.3d 1326, 1338 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 859 (7th Cir.
1995)); Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Errors that are not
unconstitutional individually cannot be added together to create a constitutional violation.”).
42 Hood v. Dretke, 93 F. App’x 665, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Westley v. Johnson, 83
F.3d 714, 726 (5th Cir. 1996)) (“Claims that are not prejudicial, however, cannot be
cumulated, regardless of the number raised.”)); Derden, 978 F.2d at 1454; United States v.
Birdsell, 775 F.2d 645, 654 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Because none of these alleged improprieties has
been found to be prejudicial, their consideration in combination cannot change that
conclusion.”).
43 Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 447 (6th Cir. 2002). Treating cumulative error as a
separate claim, in a sense, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Jimenez v. Walker,
458 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2006), ruled that the petitioner must exhaust a cumulative error theory
in the state courts. Id. at 133; see also United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 157 (2d Cir.
1998).
44 United States v. Fernandez, 145 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v.
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recognized in the lower courts. John Blume and Christopher Seeds argue that
prejudice from all errors affecting reliability should be cumulated.45 For
example, both prosecutorial misconduct and ineffectiveness of defense counsel
should be considered together.46 Because the cumulative error “doctrine is
inconsistently and rarely applied,”47 it has not always been used to look across
errors by both prosecution and defense lawyers. Sometimes, if the prosecutor
concealed evidence from the defense, courts will rule that the conduct was not
fully prejudicial because the defense lawyer could have suspected there was
inadequate discovery and failed to press an investigation into the matter.
A few scattered courts view the errors together. Even the Supreme Court has,
perhaps without realizing it, engaged in the sensible cumulative analysis of both
prosecution and defense prejudice to the defendant.48 As a result of the failure
to properly apply cumulative harm, a truly unreliable verdict—one where the
errors occur across different types of constitutional claims—may not be
remedied. Cumulative harm should be more broadly remedied in criminal cases.
C. Cumulative Eighth Amendment Claims
These constitutional criminal procedure examples are not the only examples
of rights in which multiple barriers to realizing a common constitutional right
are considered together when deciding whether to grant a remedy. There are still
more constitutional rights where a violation may implicate multiple separate
acts, and therefore, within the right, violations may be accumulated. For
example, the Supreme Court has held that some “conditions of confinement may
establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’ when each would not
do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces
the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need.”49 The relevant transaction
for a given constitutional violation can be defined broadly, to constitute a single
“claim,” or narrowly, to require separate litigation of different acts. Aggregation
can be seen as simply broadening the concept of the relevant constitutional harm

Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1195-96 (1st Cir. 1993)).
45 John H. Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters: Reassociating Bagley
Materiality, Strickland Prejudice, and Cumulative Harmless Error, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1153, 1154 (2005) (arguing that “the impact of all errors that potentially affect
the reliability of a verdict be taken into account”).
46 Id. at 1154-55.
47 Id. at 1154.
48 Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 699 n.17 (2004) (noting in addition to evidence
concealed by the prosecution, evidence that the defense failed to develop regarding who
started the fight); see also Blume & Seeds, supra note 45, at 1182 n.112. For a state court
example, see State v. Gunsby, 670 So. 2d 920, 924 (Fla. 1996). For a federal court example,
although ultimately denying relief, see Gonzales v. McKune, 247 F.3d 1066, 1078 (10th Cir.
2001), vacated in part, 279 F.3d 922 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
49 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (rejecting the contention that “no claim can
be found to fail that test in isolation”).
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to include multiple acts that may violate a single constitutional right, but also
multiple acts that may violate more than one constitutional provision.
D. Procedural Due Process
Due process cases involving deprivation of access to a right, whether it is
access to courts, voting, marriage, or welfare, or the fair trial rights just
discussed, commonly consider multiple types of procedural barriers to the
underlying constitutionally cognizable interest in life, liberty, or property. For
example, when examining procedural due process claims challenging denial of
welfare benefits, courts conduct a cost-benefit balancing test under Mathews v.
Eldridge50 and examine a range of features relating to the notice and opportunity
to be heard provided by the agency regarding planned termination of benefits.51
In a case like Mathews, the lack of a right to a pretermination of benefits hearing
was found constitutional due to the presence of notice and plaintiff’s ability to
challenge the pending decision through submissions to the agency;52 in contrast,
in a case like Goldberg v. Kelly,53 the cumulative lack of notice detailing the
reasons for the termination of benefits and hearing procedures including a right
to counsel, a right to impartial adjudication by a neutral decision-maker, and a
right to cross-examine witnesses, caused the Court to find the entire process to
have been violative of due process.54 When conducting a due process analysis,
the entire process is examined, with the court asking whether it is fundamentally
fair, or whether it satisfies the distinctive Mathews balancing test.
The key to understanding this category is that the things being aggregated are
the individual acts of harm against the individual, not the number of
constitutional provisions or theories under which she could seek redress. As with
“hostile environment” work harassment claims, sometimes one event will be so
severe that it creates a hostile environment, but in other instances the accrual of
many relatively small instances of harassment can amount to the same thing.55
Thus, procedural due process cases necessarily involve both a deprivation of a
constitutionally cognizable underlying life, liberty or property interest, and in
addition, a consideration of the totality of the procedures used in connection with
the deprivation.

50

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 334.
52 Id. at 349 (“We conclude that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the
termination of disability benefits and that the present administrative procedures fully comport
with due process.”).
53 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
54 Id. at 263-64.
55 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“A recurring point in
these opinions is that ‘simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless
extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of
employment.’” (citation omitted)).
51
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HYBRID RIGHTS

In sharp contrast to cases of aggregate harm are cases of hybrid rights. In these
cases, rather than alleging that multiple individual harms, taken together, add up
to a constitutional violation, the plaintiff alleges that a single action violates
multiple constitutional provisions. Obviously, there is nothing wrong with
pleading a case using multiple theories. Litigants do this all the time because
they cannot know precisely what facts will be uncovered in discovery or what
theories will most persuade a judge, and they also need to preserve their
arguments for appeal. The problem that concerns us here arises if none of these
claims is a winning claim on its own, and none introduces additional actions or
harms not present in the other claims (as with the aggregate situation just
discussed). Faced with that problem, some plaintiffs nevertheless argue that the
existence of partial violations of multiple provisions should lead to victory. We
are skeptical of such claims.
A. Hybrid Rights in Fiallo
As a practical matter, this argument usually arises when plaintiffs are seeking
a higher level of constitutional scrutiny than their claims would otherwise
receive. Consider, for example, Fiallo v. Bell,56 a case in which U.S. citizens
challenged the denial of visas to their children.57 Under the then-current
immigration statute, the definition of “child” did not include a nonmarital child
seeking preference through his biological father.58 Cleophus Warner, one of the
plaintiffs in the case, argued that the statute discriminated against him in two
ways—as a man and as a nonmarital father.59 Ordinarily, either of these claims
would have resulted in the application of heightened scrutiny.60 Because Fiallo
was an immigration case, however, the Court applied the “plenary power
doctrine,” which required the Court to be highly deferential to Congress in
matters concerning foreign affairs and national security, and it therefore applied
only a very deferential form of rational basis review.61 Rather than taking on the

56

430 U.S. 787 (1977).
Id. at 790 (“Appellants are three sets of unwed natural fathers and their illegitimate
offspring who sought, either as an alien father or an alien child, a special immigration
preference by virtue of a relationship to a citizen or resident alien child or parent.”).
58 Id. at 788-89 (explaining Section 101(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952).
59 Id. at 794.
60 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (describing how the Court
“has carefully inspected official action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or
to men)”); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461-63 (1988) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
illegitimacy discrimination claim); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (“Despite
the conclusion that classifications based on illegitimacy fall in a ‘realm of less than strictest
scrutiny,’ . . . the scrutiny ‘is not a toothless one’ . . . .” (citations omitted)).
61 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 n.4 (“[D]ue process places some limitations on congressional
power in the immigration area . . . [b]ut that the formulation of these policies is entrusted
57
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plenary power doctrine, Warner’s lawyers argued that the “double-barreled”
discrimination based on gender and illegitimacy should lead to a higher level of
scrutiny.62 Warner lost.63
Although there are excellent arguments that the Court decided the case
wrongly,64 we do not think that its failure to recognize the “double-barreled”
discrimination of sex and illegitimacy is one of them. Why should the fact that
Warner was discriminated against as a man who had fathered a child outside of
marriage mean that he was more deserving of constitutional redress than, say, a
man excluded from entry into the United States simply because he was a man,
or a nonmarital child excluded simply as a nonmarital child? All of these
examples involve invidious discrimination of various types; the sex-plusillegitimacy fact pattern simply manifests that discrimination in a way that links
two quasi-protected classes. Indeed, historically, discrimination against
nonmarital children was a manifestation of sex discrimination: men could
choose whether to take legal responsibility for their children by marrying, while
women were given parental authority and responsibility only if unmarried.65
In other words, one of the reasons why illegitimacy discrimination receives
heightened scrutiny is that it is already a species of sex discrimination. The
central problem of Fiallo was whether the government should be able to exercise

exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial
tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government . . . .” (quoting Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954))). For a more detailed discussion of the plenary power doctrine in
the immigration context, see Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601,
615-17 (2013).
62 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794.
63 Id. at 793-94 (rejecting the suggestion to adopt a “more searching judicial scrutiny”).
64 See, e.g., Kristin A. Collins, Deference and Deferral: Constitutional Structure and the
Durability of Gender-Based Nationality Laws, in THE PUBLIC LAW OF GENDER: FROM LOCAL
TO GLOBAL 73, 79-85 (Kim Rubenstein & Katharine Young eds., 2016); Kenneth L. Karst,
The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 649-50 (1980) (critiquing Fiallo for
focusing on harm to parent rather than harm to children); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 607 (1990) (“The Court [in Fiallo] rejected an equal
protection attack on two classifications in the statute—gender and legitimacy—that usually
trigger something more than casual scrutiny.”); Debra L. Satinoff, Sex-Based Discrimination
in U.S. Immigration Law: The High Court’s Lost Opportunity to Bridge the Gap Between
What We Say and What We Do, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1353, 1375 (1999) (opining that Fiallo
Court overemphasized its “limited authority to review Congress’s decisions with regard to
immigration than it did on examining the discriminatory sex-based classification”); Peter H.
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1984)
(questioning the basis for juridical deference in Fiallo and other cases).
65 See Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties: The Failure of
Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669, 1685-93 (2000) (discussing the
intersection of coverture and citizenship law).
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such broad discretion when its actions cut so deeply into family life.66 As we
will argue in Part III, a more satisfying understanding of Fiallo (and one that
might have led to a better outcome for the plaintiffs) would have been to
understand it as an intersectional rights case, where the plaintiffs’ rights to
family reunification were violated in a way that was magnified by invidious
discrimination.
B. The Smith II Hybrid Rights Doctrine
Perhaps the most famous—and most criticized—instantiation of hybrid rights
in U.S. constitutional law is the Supreme Court’s endorsement of a hybrid rights
approach in Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II).67 Smith II marked a
substantial change in the Court’s free exercise of religion jurisprudence,
overruling a series of prior cases applying heightened scrutiny and a “compelling
interest” test in such cases.68 Smith II discarded that approach by holding that
“the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or
proscribes).’”69 While finding a regulation valid without applying heightened
scrutiny, the majority did not explicitly overrule the Court’s prior decisions
applying heightened scrutiny.
Instead, Justice Scalia, who authored the opinion, distinguished prior cases by
noting that all such cases had happened to involve not just religious speech, but
also other behavior that implicated other constitutional protections in
conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause.70 Justice Scalia explained that “[t]he
only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application
of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have
involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections.”71 The Court called such cases
ones involving a “hybrid situation,” where a free exercise claim was conjoined

66 Cf. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513 (1977) (invalidating city zoning
ordinance prohibiting grandmother to live with her grandson).
67 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990) (distinguishing case from others involving “the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections”).
68 See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1120-28 (1990) (arguing that Smith II is inconsistent with the Court’s
precedents); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409 n.15 (1992) (collecting the scholarly
criticisms of Smith II).
69 Smith II, 494 U.S. at 879. To be sure, some might argue that the break was not so
dramatic, if prior cases claiming to apply heightened review had in practice applied a less
demanding and more deferential standard.
70 See id. at 881-82 (listing precedents that involve both a free exercise claim and other
constitutional protections).
71 Id. at 881.
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with “communicative activity or parental right.”72 For example, Wisconsin v.
Yoder,73 a case involving Amish parents who wished to homeschool their
children, implicated not just free exercise, but also a fundamental right of parents
to supervise their children’s upbringing.74 Thus, the Court implied that the
parents in Yoder had a losing free exercise claim, but that this claim, combined
with their Fourteenth Amendment fundamental right claim, was enough to
demonstrate constitutional harm.75
Commentators have termed this a “hybrid rights” exception, based on Justice
Scalia’s suggestion that a free exercise claim that otherwise would not receive
heightened scrutiny under Smith II does receive heightened scrutiny under a
“compelling interest” test in the “hybrid situation” where another constitutional
right is implicated by the state action.76 The presence of another constitutional
violation serves to elevate the scrutiny applied.
Justice Scalia did not further explain this hybrid rights exception in Smith II.
Some commentators treat the use of prior precedent and the hybrid rights
discussion as merely a disingenuous and strained effort to distinguish individual
cases that were problematic for the majority’s new holding.77 Indeed, Justice
Scalia’s repeated repudiation of the parental rights cases, most recently in his
plurality opinion in Kerry v. Din78 and his dissent in Obergefell, further supports
the theory that his treatment of them in the Smith II decision was a means for
deciding against the plaintiffs there.79 If the discussion of the situation (not

72 Id. at 882 (“The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but free exercise
claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right.”).
73 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
74 Smith II, 494 U.S. at 882 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36).
75 Smith II, 404 U.S. at 881-82 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36) (“The present case does
not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any
communicative activity or parental right.”).
76 See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights
Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 431 (1994)
(“In other words, the cumulative effect of two or more partial constitutional rights equals one
sufficient constitutional claim.”); Heather M. Good, “The Forgotten Child of Our
Constitution”: The Parental Free Exercise Right to Direct the Education and Religious
Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY L.J. 641, 654-60 (2005) (investigating hybrid rights
doctrine); Esser, supra note 8, at 211-12 (categorizing and analyzing lower court’s application
of hybrid rights exception).
77 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 902 (1994) (“Justice Scalia had only five votes. He apparently
believed he couldn’t overrule anything, and so he didn’t. He distinguished everything away
instead.”); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 308, 309 (1991) (“[Smith II’s] use of precedent borders on fiction.”); McConnell,
supra note 68, at 1122 (arguing that “a legal realist would tell us . . . that the Smith Court’s
notion of ‘hybrid’ claims was not intended to be taken seriously”).
78 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (plurality opinion).
79 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
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present in Smith II) in which additional constitutional rights led to heightened
scrutiny under the First Amendment was not only dicta, but highly resultsoriented dicta that perhaps explains in part why the account in Smith II was so
thin. The consequences of not explaining why it mattered, in the cases being
distinguished, that additional constitutional rights were implicated, would then
be felt in the lower courts.
Smith II’s doctrinal incoherence has made it a very difficult precedent to
apply, at least in cases potentially raising the hybrid rights theory articulated. In
response to the case, plaintiffs began to assert claims under the theory that courts
should apply heightened scrutiny where free exercise interests were
circumscribed in a context that implicated another right, most commonly due
process rights relating to childrearing.80 In such cases, the First, Seventh, Eight,
Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits all recognize heightened scrutiny for hybrid
rights.81 The remaining circuits have rejected the doctrine.82 Even in those
circuits that ostensibly recognize the hybrid rights doctrine, courts frequently
invoke the exception as simply another basis to support a holding that is already
based upon an independent constitutional violation.83 Some courts are quite
opinion is couched in a style that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic . . . . Of course the
opinion’s showy profundities are often profoundly incoherent.”); Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2134
(characterizing the Court’s previous parental rights opinions as exhibiting a “propensity for
grandiloquence when reviewing the sweep of implied rights” and rejecting these previous
holdings as “dicta”).
80 See, e.g., Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 655-56
(10th Cir. 2006) (rejecting Appellant’s claim on hybrid rights exception). Meanwhile, a
political reaction to the holding in Smith II led Congress to pass the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, which the Court held to overturn Smith II as applied to federal
government action. Smith II, however, still applies to nonfederal government action and the
doctrine of hybrid rights is still invoked by plaintiffs in an attempt to trigger heightened
review. San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1030 n.3 (9th Cir.
2004).
81 See Grace, 451 F.3d at 655-56; San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1031-32; AxsonFlynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1301 (10th Cir. 2004); Civil Liberties for Urban Believers
v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2003); Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207
(9th Cir. 1999); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1998);
McDonough v. The Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Brown v. Hot,
Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting plaintiffs’ contention
that their free exercise claim falls under the hybrid rights exception); Cornerstone Bible
Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464, 472-73 (8th Cir. 1991).
82 Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2003); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of
the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
83 See Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the plaintiff’s claim succeeds under the free exercise clause and is consistent
with the hybrid rights exception); Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp.
659, 671 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (holding a school prohibition of rosaries invalid because it violated
plaintiff’s free speech rights, was void for vagueness, and did not pass heightened scrutiny
under the hybrid exception in Smith II); Ala. & Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Trs. of the Big
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explicit that the hybrid rights theory is surplusage, used to bolster an already
successful non-free exercise constitutional violation.84 Only the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have addressed the question of how strong an independent
constitutional right would need to be to assert a cognizable hybrid rights claim.85
They require plaintiffs, in addition to asserting a free exercise claim, to “assert
at least a ‘colorable’ claim to an independent constitutional right,”86 and “a ‘fair
probability’ or a ‘likelihood’ . . . of success on the [companion claim].”87 But
this approach still remains largely theoretical because there does not appear to
be a single case where a plaintiff has prevailed on such a hybrid rights claim.88
This experience in the lower courts reflects an understandable reluctance to
recognize a hybrid right. Unlike the aggregate harm cases discussed previously,
hybrid rights cases do not involve situations in which multiple claims address a

Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1332 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (avoiding the application
of Smith II and applying the hybrid exception just because the plaintiffs “have alleged a hybrid
claim”).
84 Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1550 n.21 (D. Neb. 1996) (stating that hybrid
rights claims are not independent but rather are used to “bolster [a] Free Exercise claim by
demonstrating [a] violation of another fundamental constitutional right”); Jane L. v.
Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537, 1547 (D. Utah 1992) (holding that the hybrid rights exception
does not apply because the plaintiffs have not alleged a “violation of another constitutional
protection”); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 786 F. Supp. 1308, 1313 (S.D.
Ohio 1992) (stating that the hybrid rights exception only applies when a plaintiff is “entitled
to relief based on more than one constitutional theory”); see also Esser, supra note 8, at 24243 (“[W]hen a court allows a hybrid to ‘win’ by applying strict scrutiny to the claim, it never
does so as the primary basis for the decision.”).
85 See Grace, 451 F.3d at 656 (“[L]itigant is required to assert at least a ‘colorable’ claim
to an independent constitutional right to survive summary judgment.”).
86 Id.
87 Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999).
88 See Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the
Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN. ST. L. REV.
573, 578-79 (2003) (collecting cases). In cases where the hybrid rights claim fails, the court
often finds that the plaintiff has not met the burden of showing a colorable claim. See, e.g.,
Grace, 451 F.3d at 656 (“[Appellant] has not presented a colorable independent constitutional
claim.”); Miller, 176 F.3d at 1208 (holding the plaintiff’s companion constitutional claims
were meritless); Christian Legal Soc’y v. Kane, No. 04-04484, 2006 WL 997217, at *26 (N.D.
Cal. May 19, 2006) (“Because the Court finds that none of CLS’s claims for violations of
their constitutional rights have merit, there is no basis for their alleged ‘hybrid-rights’
claim.”); Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1188 (D. Nev. 2005) (“The
Court has found . . . that Plaintiffs do not have a viable Freedom of Expression claim.”);
Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 406 F. Supp. 2d 507, 520
(D.N.J. 2005) (“[S]uch a ‘hybrid rights’ claim fails because plaintiffs’ other constitutional law
claims fail.”). Even in cases where a plaintiff has made a colorable claim, their case fails
because the government action meets the requirements of any heightened scrutiny. Vineyard
Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 250 F. Supp. 2d 961, 989 (N.D.
Ill. 2003).
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single constitutional harm. Nor do they involve rights that stem from multiple
constitutional sources, as do the claims in the intersectional rights category to
which we next turn.
III. INTERSECTIONAL RIGHTS
In contrast with the purely additive nature of the hybrid rights doctrine, many
constitutional cases involve multiple constitutional claims that gain meaning
when heard together and amplify the cognizable harm. Many of the cases that
could be dismissed as “two-for-one sales” may actually be intersectional cases
that deserve to be heard. It is thus crucial that courts understand how to
distinguish hybrid rights cases from intersectional ones.
The notion of intersectional harm has long been a feature of employment
discrimination scholarship, most notably associated with writers in the late
1980s and early 1990s who observed that claims of discrimination brought by
women of color were often misunderstood by courts because they were
cognizable only as either sex discrimination or race discrimination claims.89
Coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw, the term “intersectionality” sought to bring
courts’ attention to the ways in which black women’s claims of discrimination
often fell through the cracks. They were not discriminated against as women,
nor were they discriminated against as black; instead, they were discriminated
against in a more particularized way, one that drew on both identities and
magnified the discrimination. Having to characterize particular events as

89

See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-Racist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139-40 (criticizing the “single-axis framework dominant in
antidiscrimination law”). Other legal scholars also contributed to the development of
intersectionality theory. See, e.g., Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539,
539 (“[Decrying [the dearth of writings on the legal problems of minority women and urg[ing]
minority feminist legal scholars to focus their professional energies on filling the gap.”);
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender,
1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 395-96 (urging courts to consider “the interactive relationship between
racism and sexism” in antidiscrimination law); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (arguing that “gender essentialism”
neglects the voice of black women). Scholars working in fields such as philosophy and
sociology simultaneously developed the idea in those fields. See, e.g., PATRICIA HILL
COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF
EMPOWERMENT 299 (2d ed. 2000) (explaining intersectionality); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN,
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 1-9 (1988) (arguing
that feminist theory reflects a white and middle-class bias). Intersectionality has continued to
be an important theory in employment discrimination literature; it has made some inroads into
court decisions, and it has been the subject of scholarship in a range of disciplines. See, e.g.,
Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994); Hae Yeon Choo & Myra Marx
Ferree, Practicing Intersectionality in Sociological Research: A Critical Analysis of
Inclusions, Interactions, and Institutions in the Study of Inequalities, 28 SOC. THEORY 129,
130 (2010).
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evidence of either race or sex discrimination diluted the force of their claims and
failed to account for the harm they experienced.90
This concept can be applied with equal force in the constitutional context. In
the constitutional context, however, the theory is not limited to cases involving
two types of discrimination. Thus, although it is certainly possible to think of
intersectional claims involving multiple types of invidious discrimination that
work together to cause constitutional harm, in many other instances, the
intersectionality often will flow not from harm based on multiple subordinated
identities but from the interaction of multiple constitutional rights.
Although our application of intersectionality theory to constitutional law is
new, the recognition of intersectional rights is not. This recognition has
periodically emerged in constitutional doctrine in various guises—as
“penumbras” emanating from a litany of distinct constitutional rights in
Griswold,91 as “fundamental rights equal protection” in cases such as Zablocki
v. Redhail,92 and, more recently, in Justice Kennedy’s LGBT rights
jurisprudence in Romer v. Evans,93 Lawrence,94 Windsor,95 and Obergefell,96 in
which substantive due process and equal protection claims operate in tandem. In
all of these instances, we believe that the Court was grasping to express why the
simultaneous violation of multiple distinct constitutional rights can result in
cognizable constitutional harm. We argue that rights can augment each other and
that the Court has been correct in recognizing a violation in many of these cases.
In subsequent sections, we will also develop how an additional right may
perform a different function: an evidentiary function, helping judges to better
understand the nature of a violation; a unifying function assisting in the
development of a new constitutional standard separate from that used in either
constitutional claim; and conversely, a limiting function, constraining another
right and encouraging a court to proceed more cautiously.
A. Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process
The idea of intersectional constitutional rights has been well developed in a
particular context: cases in which equal protection and substantive due process
rights are both at issue. Traditionally, substantive due process has protected a
limited menu of “fundamental rights” from government intrusion, while equal
90 For an excellent example, see the treatment of the Jew case in Sumi K. Cho, Converging
Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment: Where the Model Minority Meets Suzie Wong,
1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177, 195-99 (1997) (describing a hostile working environment case
created by “[g]ender stereotypes with racial overtones”).
91 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“In other words, the First
Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”).
92 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry).
93 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
94 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
95 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
96 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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protection has protected individuals against discrimination by the government.97
But in some cases, these rights have merged.
The doctrine of “fundamental rights equal protection” is a good example.
Under this doctrine, even rights that might not have received protection under
the Due Process Clause standing alone can be vindicated when they are infringed
in unequal ways. For example, the right to marry, the right to travel, the right to
procreate, and the right to vote have all been rights that have been understood in
this manner.98 These rights may not exist independently as either enumerated
rights or as due process protections, but once the government grants or denies
them in a discriminatory manner it must justify its discrimination at the level of
heightened scrutiny. In other words, under the fundamental rights equal
protection doctrine, the discrimination augments the harm of governmental
intrusion into or denial of a right.
Pamela Karlan has used the apt phrase “stereoscopic harm” to show that equal
protection analysis and substantive due process norms can influence each other:
“the ideas of equality and liberty expressed in the equal protection and due
process clauses each emerge from and reinforce the other.”99 In particular,
Karlan observes that “looking at an issue stereoscopically—through the lenses
of both the due process clause and the equal protection clause—can have
synergistic effects, producing results that neither clause might reach by itself.”100
Similarly, Kenneth Karst approves of the Court’s “integration of appeals to
equality and liberty” in constitutional privacy cases because “the two
Clauses . . . are expressions of the substantive core of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which is a guarantee of equal citizenship.”101
One important intersectional rights case highlighted by Karlan is M.L.B. v.
S.L.J.102 There, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion struck down a statute
terminating a mother’s parental rights based on her financial inability to pay a
fee, relying on both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.103 The Court emphasized that a long line of prior

97 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (describing how substantive due process
provides “heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental
rights and liberty interests” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997))).
98 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (right to travel); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (right to marry); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757
(1966) (right to travel); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (right to vote); Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942) (right to procreate).
99 Karlan, supra note 18, at 474.
100 Id.; see also Karst, supra note 17, at 99 (“[T]he right of equal citizenship . . . has also
found notable expression in substantive liberties protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
101 Kenneth L. Karst, Those Appealing Indigents: Justice Ginsburg and the Claims of
Equal Citizenship, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 927, 938 (2009); see also Karst, supra note 17, at 137-38
(observing a trend away from equal protection categories).
102 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
103 Id. at 113-15, 120.

2017]

CUMULATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

1333

decisions concerning access to courts “reflect both equal protection and due
process concerns,” implicating equal protection by singling people out “based
solely on their inability to pay” but also the due process concern regarding “the
essential fairness” of such action.104 In contrast, Justice Clarence Thomas in
dissent objected that the majority did not sufficiently “specify the source of the
relief” it granted and that its reasoning was “ambiguous.”105 Karlan observes
that the result in M.L.B. “can be explained only by importing due process into
the equal protection theory.”106 It was well established that litigants in civil cases
do not have a right to appeal at state expense, and that poverty alone does not
produce a due process violation. Only by demonstrating her interest in having a
continued relationship to her child was “far more precious than any property
right”107 was M.L.B. able to demonstrate that her lack of access to the courts
violated equal protection. As Karlan puts it, “[e]qual access was required
because the right being adjudicated in the underlying proceeding was a
fundamental one.”108 M.L.B. provides a preview to the Court’s recent adoption
of an intersectional rights approach in a much more widely noted case in
Obergefell. There, Justice Kennedy described the harm suffered by gays and
lesbians primarily as a violation of their due process liberty rights. He noted,
however, that the right derives also from equal protection: “The Due Process
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way,” the
opinion explains, “though they set forth independent principles.”109 In a nod to
those who believe the two clauses protect distinct rights, the opinion notes that
“[i]n any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the
right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may
converge in the identification and definition of the right.”110
The opinion then spends a substantial amount of space working through
previous cases in which equal protection and substantive due process have
converged. Loving v. Virginia,111 the case in which the Court invalidated a ban
on interracial marriage, for example, rested on both equal protection and
substantive due process principles.112 The Obergefell opinion acknowledges
Loving’s conceptual merging of the two clauses; Loving held that “[t]o deny this
fundamental freedom [of marriage] on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive
of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely
104

Id. at 120.
Id. at 130 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106 Karlan, supra note 18, at 483.
107 Id. at 482.
108 Id. at 482-83.
109 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015).
110 Id. at 2603.
111 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
112 Id. at 12 (citing the Equal Protection Clause first, and then the Due Process Clause as
the foundation for the Court’s invalidation of the ban).
105
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to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.”113 “The
reasons why marriage is a fundamental right,” Obergefell explains, “became
more clear and compelling from a full awareness and understanding of the hurt
that resulted from laws barring interracial unions.”114
Obergefell continues to tell the story of the “synergy” between equal
protection and due process claims by discussing several additional cases. These
include: Zablocki, a case decided on equal protection grounds but rooted in the
“fundamental right” to marry;115 M.L.B., which struck down “a statue requiring
indigent mothers to pay a fee in order to appeal the termination of their parental
rights”;116 Eisenstadt, in which the Court invalidated “a prohibition on the
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried” women;117 and Skinner v.
Oklahoma,118 which invalidated a law that allowed the sterilization of
criminals.119 Justice Kennedy even his own opinion in Lawrence, which struck
down an anti-sodomy law under the Due Process Clause, as having drawn on
“principles of liberty and equality to define and protect the rights of gays and
lesbians.”120
Having configured the Court’s precedents in a way that highlighted the
linkages between equal protection and substantive due process, the opinion then
considers the principle of same-sex marriage. The opinion could be read as
simply striking down the state same-sex marriage bans separately under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses: “It is now clear that the challenged laws
burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that
they abridge central precepts of equality.”121 But Justice Kennedy went further,
implying there is something particularly offensive and harmful about denying
marriage to this particular group of people: “Especially against a long history of
disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to
marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on
gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”122

113

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
Id.
115 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1977) (striking down a law that barred
fathers who were behind on child support payments from marrying). In Obergefell, Justice
Kennedy noted that “[t]he synergy between the two protections is illustrated further in
Zablocki”—where “[t]he equal protection analysis depended in central part on the Court’s
holding that the law burdened a right ‘of fundamental importance.’” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at
2603 (quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383).
116 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119-24 (1996)).
117 Id. at 2604 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972)).
118 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
119 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-43).
120 Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)).
121 Id.
122 Id.
114
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Although Obergefell states that equal protection and due process can inform
one another explicitly, it fails to completely flesh out the way in which harms to
liberty that might not reach constitutional magnitude if suffered by everyone
take on a different case when inflicted in a discriminatory way. Imagine, for
example, that a state, rather than banning same-sex marriage, simply banned
marriage.123 Standing alone, a ban on marriage might not deny individuals their
due process rights to liberty if marriage brought with it only limited government
benefits. Surely, there is no due process right to be exempt from the estate tax,
or to get access to health insurance, or to own a home through tenancy in the
entirety—all privileges currently enjoyed by married couples in some states.
There might be a due process liberty interest in living with the adult partner of
one’s choosing, or living with one’s genetic relatives.124 The key to Obergefell
and the other marriage cases is the bundling of multiple substantial government
benefits into a legal status of cultural heft called “marriage,” and then denying
some but not all people from accessing that status.125 The Court implied that the
discrimination claim and the fundamental rights claim, standing alone, were not
as strong. Whether the Court should have instead recognized, for example, that
a discrimination claim standing alone sufficed is another important question.126
Obergefell instead held that both constitutional sources inform a constitutional

123 This is not a merely academic exercise: some lawmakers have recently come out in
favor of banning marriage altogether in the wake of the legalization of same-sex marriage.
See, e.g., Nicole Flatow, Oklahoma Lawmaker Wants to Ban All Marriages,
THINKPROGRESS.ORG
(Jan.
25,
2014),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/01/25/3205541/oklahoma-lawmaker-ban-marriagesrevival-jim-crow-tactic/ [https://perma.cc/72CU-Q49G].
124 Cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.”); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1977) (“The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and
especially grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.”); Gregg Strauss, The Positive
Right to Marry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1691, 1720-21 (2016) (suggesting that “the remaining laws
against cohabitation are obsolete and likely unconstitutional”).
125 See Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40-44 (2012) (developing
how the administrative state has transformed the institution of marriage by using marital status
for the purpose of benefits eligibility determinations); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss,
Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1377 (2010) (describing an
“equal access” requirement grounded in equal protection jurisprudence).
126 We nevertheless believe that Obergefell should have been a winning case for the
plaintiffs regardless of whether the intersectional rights doctrine was invoked. As pure sex
discrimination claims or claims of discrimination against LGTB individuals, the restriction
should still have fallen. Indeed, there are good reasons why such an approach would have
been preferable. The choice of an intersectional approach, without making the underlying
violations explicit, can avoid necessary discussion of important harms.
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analysis that is more demanding than a due process or equal protection analysis
conducted separate and apart.127
Thus, Obergefell recognizes the continuing vitality of fundamental rights
equal protection doctrine, stretching back from early cases such as Meyer v.
Nebraska,128 decided in 1923, and Skinner, decided in 1942, to more recent cases
including Turner v. Safley,129 decided in 1987, M.L.B., decided in 1996, and the
Court’s most recent opinions in Lawrence and Windsor. Many scholars had not
appreciated the strength of that doctrine; some had dismissed the line of cases
(despite more recent cases like Turner and M.L.B., even putting to one side
Lawrence and Windsor) as a relic of earlier willingness to consider substantive
theories of equal protection, which had been displaced by a more processoriented view.130 To be sure, the Court did slow its expansion of the doctrine
when it declined to recognize a range of potential categories for fundamental
rights status.131 Obergefell is a vindication of the view, reflected in that body of
case law, that discrimination can be categorically worse when the discrimination
concerns a government benefit that is of real social and practical importance,
and not simply benign or remedial government action. Further, Obergefell is also
a vindication of Karlan’s and Karst’s theories, respectively, of stereoscopic harm
and the equal citizenship foundation of both equal protection and due process,
theories which validate the basis for fundamental rights equal protection
doctrine.132 We agree with Karlan and Karst that the link between due process
and equal protection is particularly deep and salient, and it has been and is likely
to continue to be one of the most prominent areas in which intersectional rights
claims can be recognized. Neglecting the equality dimension of a government
act can mean neglecting discrimination, but equally problematic can be
neglecting the due process dimension of a government act. Such neglect could
result in the arbitrary denial of very important rights, such as the right to vote.
127 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602-03 (explaining that the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses can “be instructive as to the meaning and reach” of each other).
128 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
129 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
130 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
MICH. L. REV. 213, 217, 285 (1991) (describing the Burger Court’s hostility to fundamental
rights equal protection as “a judicial overreaction to what many regarded as the dangerously
open-ended potential” of the doctrine, as well as a concern that it could have the “potential
for judicial wealth redistribution”). Without disagreeing at all with that characterization, we
believe the doctrine remains important for understanding the structure of equal protection
doctrine. For criticism of the doctrine’s potential for wealth redistribution, see, for example,
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972
SUP. CT. REV. 41, 58.
131 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1972) (describing the
Supreme Court’s “aversion to expansions of the new equal protection” doctrine to include
new fundamental rights).
132 See generally Karlan, supra note 18; Karst, supra note 17.
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Karlan describes how a series of the Court’s voting rights cases emphasized a
substantive right to vote, not just equality because it would not be permissible to
deny voting rights to all citizens.133
Obergefell is an important step toward recognition of this longstanding but
perhaps insufficiently defined connection between equality and due process
protections.134 As we will discuss further, however, what Obergefell did not
sufficiently do was to define what the intersectional right entails. The Court did
not define the test or the standard, beyond stating that the result was informed
by the “synergy” between the due process concern with denying access to
marriage, combined with the subordination of equal protection. As we will
describe, in a range of other contexts, the Court has more clearly explained the
legal standard that results from an intersectional constitutional analysis.
Obergefell is relatively rare in its express embrace of an intersectional equal
protection-due process approach. Some cases that appear doctrinally muddled
come into sharper focus when viewed through an intersectional rights lens (and
might have been written more clearly had the Justices adopted this view).
Consider, for example, Plyler v. Doe,135 a particularly messy opinion. In Plyler,
the Court struck down a Texas law that withheld from local school districts state
funds for the education of any children were not “legally admitted” to the United
States, and allowed local school districts to deny these children enrollment in
school.136 In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan candidly acknowledged that
the case did not fit easily into a typical equal protection framework.
“Undocumented aliens,” he explained, “cannot be treated as a suspect class
because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a
‘constitutional irrelevancy.’”137 Similarly, “education” is not “a fundamental
right” and “a State need not justify by compelling necessity every variation in
the manner in which education is provided to its population.”138 Yet the Court
required Texas to demonstrate that its law was justified by a showing that it

133 Karlan, supra note 18, at 490 (“The Fourteenth Amendment has simply evolved beyond
the point at which a state can strip citizens of their right to participate in choosing the
president.”).
134 Obergefell is a far from perfect opinion. In addition to its failure to adequately, in our
view, develop the equal protection harm caused by discrimination against LGTB individuals,
it includes deeply troubling language that some believe is likely to encourage legal doctrines
that can marginalize unmarried people. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and
Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207 (2016). Our focus here is on the opinion’s
use of an intersectional constitutional analysis; to the extent that the Court’s failure to specify
the content of the intersection it relied upon, however, the intersectional analysis may have
helped to elide important discriminatory harms.
135 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
136 Id. at 205.
137 Id. at 223.
138 Id.
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served a “substantial state interest”—an intermediate scrutiny analysis.139 It did
so by considering another factor—the cost to the nation of producing a class of
uneducated people who would not be able to participate fully in civic life.140
At first glance, Plyler appears to be misapplying the state interest in its
analysis. A traditional equal protection analysis would first ask whether a
fundamental right or suspect class was at issue, and, if so, then hold the state to
a higher level of scrutiny of its interest and the fit between the interest and the
law. Instead, Plyler considers the long-term interests of the state in having an
educated population as part of the question of what level of scrutiny to apply.141
Read instead as an intersectional rights case, Plyler takes on a different cast.
Although the state has an interest in an educated population, the real interest at
stake is the interest of the children themselves. Plyler goes to great lengths to
emphasize the “innocence” of children brought illegally to the United States by
their parents,142 and the lasting harm they will suffer if deprived of an
education.143 The opinion views children as particularly vulnerable, and
particularly in need of state protection. What might constitute “due process” for
an adult might not for a child. Plyler can be read as a case in which the equal
protection interest of undocumented children is read intersectionally with the
due process interest in obtaining an education, even while neither interest on its
own would merit heightened scrutiny.
In short, many of the most famous equal protection and substantive due
process cases can be understood as “intersectional rights” cases. The names of
the doctrines have changed over time, from “penumbras” to “fundamental rights
equal protection” to “rational basis with bite,” but the common theme in these
cases has been the understanding of courts that some forms of discrimination are
particularly invidious because of the importance of the interest being denied.
B. Intersectionality Beyond Equal Protection and Due Process
Intersectional equal protection-substantive due process cases are fairly
common. One might say that these two rights “travel well together,” perhaps in
part because of their common history and constitutional context. But we think it
is a mistake to limit the intersectional rights theory to due process-equal
protection or fundamental rights-equal protection cases. There are many other
instances in which rights can operate intersectionally.
For example, as Julie Nice has observed, although the plaintiffs lost in
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,144 Justice Ginsburg recognized that their
claims—expressive association and free speech—”merge[d]” and were “closely

139
140
141
142
143
144

Id. at 229.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 224, 230.
Id. at 222-24.
561 U.S. 661, 697 (2010).
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linked.”145 The Supreme Court, as it put it in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,146 “has
occasionally fused the First Amendment into the Equal Protection Clause,” in
its analysis of speech claims that combine a restriction of speech with evidence
of discriminatory enforcement.147 There is nothing “occasional,” of course,
about the relevance of content and viewpoint discrimination to First Amendment
analysis.148
It is also common, of course, for constitutional standards to be informed not
just by rights provisions, but also by structural provisions or concerns, such as
when federalism concerns temper and inform constitutional interpretation. It is
well understood that Supreme Court rulings often narrow the potential scope of
constitutional rights by citing federalism concerns. Similarly, in rulings
interpreting the reach of congressional or executive power, the Supreme Court
may be far less deferential in its analysis if individual rights are implicated.149
Less appreciated are rulings involving intersectional rights in which a separate
federalism or structural provision buttresses an individual right. Windsor, as
commentators have discussed, incorporates federalism concerns in its analysis,
alongside liberty and equality concerns.150 Federalism concerns often animate
decisions that recognize fundamental rights, and those aspects of such decisions
are particularly prominent in cases like Windsor, in which the Supreme Court
surveys emerging consensus in the states.151 There are also cases in which rights
are primarily drawn from multiple structural provisions. Boumediene v. Bush,152

145 See Julie A. Nice, How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment of CLS v.
Martinez, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 665-66 (2011) (quoting Christian Legal Soc’y, 561
U.S. at 663) (analogizing this linkage to Justice Kennedy’s linkage of equal protection and
liberty interests in his Lawrence opinion).
146 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
147 Id. at 384 n.4.
148 Id.; see also, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504-05 (1999) (discussing right to travel
and the right to equal protection); Police Dep’t. of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1972)
(examining ordinance that exempted certain labor picketing from the city’s general
prohibition on picketing next to a school under an analysis that recognized the “intertwined”
nature of the First and Fourteenth Amendments in the case). But see, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n
v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 54 (1983) (declining to impose heightened
scrutiny under an equal protection analysis after finding no First Amendment violation had
occurred).
149 E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (stating that where seizure of steel mills implicated Fifth Amendment due process
rights concerning property, “One gives a governmental authority that reaches so far as there
is law, the other gives a private right that authority shall go no farther”); see also Christopher
Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 414 (2002).
150 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 7 (explaining how Justice Kennedy “blurs the lines
between federalism, liberty, and equality, and he blurs the lines between structure and rights”
in his Windsor opinion).
151 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013).
152 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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in which the Court held that habeas corpus privilege must be extended to
detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, can be viewed as a decision
attempting to reconcile conflicting executive, legislative, and judicial powers in
a context in which individual rights were implicated.153 While the Court used
the Due Process Clause to inform its analysis in that case, it formally relied only
upon the Suspension Clause and separation of powers concerns.154 The
relevance of structural considerations to an intersectional constitutional analysis
is a broader topic that we cannot adequately treat in this Article.155
The Sixth Amendment and other substantive criminal procedure rights share
the same type of intersectional relationship. For example, we have discussed
effectiveness of counsel cases, where if the defense lawyer failed to prevent
another constitutional violation at trial, the defense lawyer may have been
particularly ineffective.156 A range of due process claims work the same way.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Panetti v. Quarterman157 involved the failure
to provide an adequate set of procedural rights at a competency hearing in a
death penalty case; competency hearings are themselves required by the Eighth
Amendment before an execution can occur.158 As a result, the Court explained
that both “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution,” entitled
the inmate to those procedures.159 A range of other rights may also involve a due
process component if the deprivation of the constitutional right is accompanied
by arbitrary or inadequate procedures; for example, many of the Court’s First
Amendment rulings focus on government procedures in the application of
regulations to speech, including, of course, the law of prior restraints on
speech.160 When the problem involves a set of government procedures, the
153

Id. at 732.
See id. at 771 (“The separation-of-powers doctrine, and the history that influences its
design, therefore must inform the reach and purpose of the Suspension Clause.”); Eric Berger,
Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional
Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2050-52 (2011) (discussing how the adequacy of the
procedures for detainees at Guantanamo Bay guided the Boumediene Court’s Suspension
Clause analysis); Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
47, 82-87 (2012) (discussing how the Boumediene Court both “disclaimed a due process
analysis” while also engaging in a discussion of due process principles that informed its
analysis).
155 Such situations are carefully explored in Coenen’s excellent article. Coenen, supra note
18, at 1086-88 (arguing that a governmental action may be more easily justified when multiple
enumerated powers are referenced to support the action).
156 See supra Section I.B (discussing ineffective counsel cases).
157 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
158 See id. at 935 (finding that the State of Texas had failed to follow the constitutionally
required procedures at the hearing).
159 Id. at 948 (explaining that the state court had failed to provide due process during the
petitioner’s competency determination).
160 See George Anastaplo, Justice Brennan, Due Process and the Freedom of Speech: A
Celebration of Speiser v. Randall, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 7, 19-20 (1986) (describing “how
154
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inquiry may be readily situated in multiple constitutional sources, and the harm
of multiple violations may demand a distinct and more searching constitutional
analysis.
In some cases, intersectional rights serve to enhance the constitutional claim
in an evidentiary manner: the presence of the additional claim helps the judge to
“see” the more complete constitutional problem. For example, in fundamental
rights equal protection cases, the added equal protection claim may help the
judge to “see” animus by making relevant to the analysis whether the
fundamental right was being denied selectively to only members of a disfavored
group.
Several constitutional cases point to an additional way that intersectional
constitutional analysis can function by making new evidence relevant to the
Government’s asserted interest. Thus, the additional constitutional right may not
just reveal enhanced harm to the plaintiff, but it may also undercut the
Government’s defense. Rather than reinforcing another right, the added right
may instead negate the government interest asserted. Thus, as in Obergefell, the
Government may assert an interest in encouraging procreation and childrearing,
but an equal protection claim calls into question why the Government is not
asserting an interest in procreation and childrearing by same-sex couples.
Similarly, in Skinner, the State asserted an interest in sterilizing offenders who
committed three or more crimes of “moral turpitude” but the law laid “an
unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of
offense,” because white collar felonies like embezzlement were not included in
the coverage of the statute.161 The equal protection claim called into question the
degree of the State’s interest in limiting procreation of felons who had exhibited
“moral turpitude,” if the State was only interested in applying its policy of
eugenics to sterilize lower-class felons and not the financial criminals. The rights
were mutually reinforcing where the second claim made relevant additional
evidence that undercut the government interest asserted.
C. Distinguishing Hybrid from Intersectional Cases
Perhaps the most challenging task judges must undertake in cases involving
cumulative constitutional rights is determining which cases are hybrid rights
cases and which are intersectional cases—separating the wheat from the chaff,
if you will. In many cases, this will be easy. A plaintiff who claims two
independent constitutional violations, neither of which has anything to do with
the other, will need to prevail on at least one, independently of the other, in order
to win her case. But in many other cases, the line between a (losing) hybrid case
and a (winning) intersectional case may be thin, and may come down to effective
much the freedom of speech and of the press has always depended upon a considerable respect
for due process”); Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process,
55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1427 (2014) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment includes an implicit
due process right to know the details of a lethal injection procedures a state plans to use).
161 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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lawyering. Some cases that courts have rejected because of a plaintiff’s hybrid
rights theory might actually have been very strong intersectional claims if the
plaintiff’s lawyer or the judge had understood them that way.
Consider again the progeny of the Smith II case. Many scholars have ridiculed
Smith II for relying on a “bad claim + bad claim = good claim” mathematical
formula.162 But as Ming Chen has argued, there are many instances in which
restrictions on free exercise coexist with racial or ethnic discrimination.
Perhaps—because of the independent commitment to equality inherent in the
Equal Protection Clause—minorities who are subject to otherwise “neutral”
laws that suppress their free exercise of religion suffer a distinctive harm not
experienced by those in the majority.163 If that is so, then the way to make sense
of Smith II is to treat it going forward as requiring a showing not just of two
unrelated constitutional harms but a specific showing in particular cases of
intersectional harm flowing from multiple constitutional sources.
Or consider again Fiallo. Sex plus illegitimacy should no more lead to
heightened scrutiny than either sex or illegitimacy alone.164 But what if instead,
the plaintiffs could have shown that they had a fundamental right to family unity,
which was being impinged upon in a discriminatory manner? The Fiallo
decision is frustrating, to our ears, not because it denies the double-barreled
discrimination of sex and illegitimacy, but because it does not recognize the
separate fundamental importance of family life, and its intersectional relation to
equal treatment.165
Compare Fiallo to Din, where the plaintiff tried to ground her claim both in
her liberty interest in marital unity and her procedural due process rights as a
U.S. citizen.166 Although Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion failed to recognize
her claim and garnered a majority for that outcome,167 the concurring opinion of
Justices Kennedy and Alito would not have reached the question of a liberty
interest,168 while Justice Breyer’s dissent reached and recognized the

162 See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s “incoherent”
reasoning in Smith II).
163 Ming Hsu Chen, Note, Two Wrongs Make a Right: Hybrid Claims of Discrimination,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 685, 687 (2004) (arguing that the hybrid rights exception is justifiable using
intersectionality theory).
164 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799-800 (1977) (denying petitioner’s claim that refusing
to grant illegitimate son’s visa on the basis of their relationship does not violate his
constitutional rights).
165 Recently, the Court again reaffirmed it does not respect that right, but in Din, only a
plurality of three unequivocally held that there is no such right. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128,
2136 (2015) (plurality opinion).
166 Id. at 2131 (denying petitioner’s claim that she had a constitutional right to reside in
the United States with her husband, who was denied a visa).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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intersection of these two rights.169 Justice Breyer wrote, “the institution of
marriage, which encompasses the right of spouses to live together and to raise a
family, is central to human life, requires and enjoys community support, and
plays a central role in most individuals’ ‘orderly pursuit of happiness.’ . . .
Similarly, the Court has long recognized that a citizen’s right to live within this
country, being fundamental, enjoys basic procedural due process protection.”170
Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion misconstrued Din’s claim as a “doublebarreled” right similar to the one made in Fiallo: “The dissent supplements the
fundamental right to marriage with a fundamental right to live in the United
States in order to find an affected liberty interest.”171 What we find compelling
about Din’s claim is its nuanced understanding that procedural interests can
affect substantive liberty interests. Din claimed not that she was entitled to
family reunification because of her liberty interest in her marriage, but rather
that her liberty interest in her marriage, coupled with her rights as a U.S. citizen,
entitled her to sufficient due process to understand the reasons why her husband
was being excluded from the United States.172 The way in which the two
independent constitutional provisions of liberty and equal protection interacted
in her particular case led to a very specific constitutional claim. Understanding
the claims made in Fiallo in this way might not have been enough in that case,
where the plaintiffs were seeking actual visas rather than procedural due process
in applying for visas.173 But a claim that family unity is an important liberty
interest, coupled with gender and illegitimacy discrimination in the allocation of
family unity, seems to us a much stronger claim than simple gender and
illegitimacy discrimination taken together.
IV. INTERSECTIONAL RIGHTS IN ACTION
An intersectional right can lead, as described in the sections above, to a court’s
application of more stringent constitutional scrutiny. Sometimes, however,
intersectional rights can operate differently. Sometimes courts respond to
recognition of intersectional rights by fashioning new constitutional standards
with tests of their own. When this occurs, lower courts may be less tentative in
applying the doctrine because articulating it as an independent “test” gives it a
heft that a highly fact-specific analysis would not have. Conversely,
intersectional analyses can sometimes lead to a tightening up of doctrine that a
purely expansive approach would not take. The application of the second right
can constrain the expansion of the first.

169

Id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (citations omitted).
171 Id. at 2134 (plurality opinion).
172 See id. at 2132 (borrowing from the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the petitioner “ha[d]
a protected liberty interest in marriage that entitled [her] to review of the denial of [her]
spouse’s visa”).
173 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 791 (1977).
170
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A. Fashioning New Constitutional Standards
There are numerous examples of the Court’s willingness to fashion a new
constitutional standard once it has undertaken a constitutional analysis.174 For
example, in Strickland, discussed above, the right to effective assistance of
counsel at trial and during pretrial representation reached further than the Sixth
Amendment text, which guarantees a right to a lawyer but not an effective
one.175 Grounded in an intersection of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, the test outlined in Strickland is now
routinely applied in cases independently—a new doctrine emerging from an
intersectional analysis. More recently, some commentators have viewed
Obergefell as establishing a new doctrine: Laurence Tribe calls it “the doctrine
of equal dignity.”176
Another prominent ruling that arose from the intersection of constitutional
claims is Batson v. Kentucky,177 in which the Court ruled that prosecutors may
not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely because of their race.178
The Court developed the Batson test as one that was not solely supported by
Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, nor by the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial in a criminal case, but rather by both.179 Other equal protection claims have
that flavor, including, of course, the right to marry decisions already discussed.
The list goes on and on, and in each context the extension of prior precedent in
a given area may be explained by the relevance of more than one constitutional
source. However, in each area, there may be additional controversy about the
implications of drawing on more than one constitutional source, and particularly
whether the Court is doing full justice to the distinctive constitutional concerns
raised by the implicated constitutional rights.

174

Coenen terms this type of interaction a form of “combination analysis.” Coenen, supra
note 18, at 1075. One minor departure from this characterization is that we view the salient
feature of this form of intersectional analysis as the creation of an entirely new constitutional
standard, whether that standard is located in one or more constitutional clauses.
175 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1984) (“The Constitution guarantees
a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial
largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment . . . .”).
176 Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 20
(2015). Tribe also describes this new doctrine as one that fuses equal protection and due
process rights. Id.
177 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
178 Id. at 100 (requiring the prosecutor to provide a neutral explanation for a decision to
peremptorily strike all black persons from the jury).
179 Id. at 83 (considering argument from defense counsel that prosecutor’s discriminatory
use of peremptory strikes violated “petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to a jury drawn from a cross section of the community, and under the Fourteenth
Amendment to equal protection of the laws”).
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To provide one more example, in Bearden v. Georgia,180 a case cited in
Obergefell,181 the Supreme Court held that the sentencing court could not revoke
the defendant’s probation for failure to pay a fine and restitution to the victim,
without supported findings that he was responsible for the failure and that
alternative forms of punishment would be inadequate to meet the State’s interest
in punishment and deterrence.182 Justice O’Connor’s opinion, citing a long line
of cases, particularly the line of access to courts cases that include Griffin v.
Illinois,183 emphasized: “This Court has long been sensitive to the treatment of
indigents in our criminal justice system . . . . Due process and equal protection
principles converge in the Court’s analysis in these cases.184 However, the
bringing together of equality and due process analysis was not an entirely
comfortable one. Justice O’Connor noted that “Justice Harlan in particular has
insisted that a due process approach more accurately captures the competing
concerns,” but in other decisions the Court had tried to keep the concerns
distinct.185 In Bearden, the Court ultimately reached its conclusion by stating
that the procedures in question violated “fundamental fairness,” but emphasized
that “[w]hether analyzed in terms of equal protection or due process, the issue
cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather
requires a careful inquiry into” the government ends, the means, and the affected
individual interests.186 Perhaps such multifactored balancing tests can more
readily accommodate multiple constitutional interests, since they are designed
to handle a particular type of government action, and can include factors that
reflect more than one constitutional concern. The resulting new formulation of
a constitutional right need not choose between competing values, either, if the
constitutional sources are compatible.
Still other constitutional rights involve the formulation of a new constitutional
standard that is premised on the failure of officials to adhere to pairs or sets of
constitutional rights. The Supreme Court’s well-known ruling in Miranda
requiring police to give the famous warnings before proceeding with a custodial
interrogation, lest the resulting confession statements be suppressed in-court,
focused on the Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled
incrimination.187 Yet, the Miranda ruling has puzzled scholars and engendered

180

461 U.S. 660 (1983).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
182 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 674.
183 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
184 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 664-66 (citing Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17).
185 Id. at 664-65 (“As we recognized in Ross v. Moffitt, . . . we generally analyze the
fairness of relations between the criminal defendant and the State under the Due Process
Clause, while we approach the question whether the State has invidiously denied one class of
defendants a substantial benefit available to another class of defendants under the Equal
Protection Clause.” (citation omitted)).
186 Id. at 666, 674.
187 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966).
181
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real controversy because it regulates not compelled self-incrimination on the
witness stand at trial, but a question of trial evidence and waiver during pretrial
questioning by police. One of the authors has argued that Miranda can be better
understood as a case regulating the intersection of constitutional law and the law
of evidence, where the constitutional right necessarily touches on questions of
admissibility.188 The Miranda right is also more fully understood as a cumulative
constitutional right. The Court’s analysis was informed by the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. After all, one of the key warnings to be given in the
interrogation room was the right to counsel. As the Court put it, a suspect facing
interrogation must be warned of the “the right to consult with an attorney, but
also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.”189 The
dissent argued that the Miranda opinion “fails to show that the Court’s new rules
are well supported, let alone compelled, by Fifth Amendment precedents.
Instead, the new rules actually derive from quotation and analogy drawn from
precedents under the Sixth Amendment, which should properly have no bearing
on police interrogation.”190
Justice Harlan, in his dissent, seemed to assume that to draw on constitutional
authority outside the Fifth Amendment was an obvious error rather than a
strength of the ruling.191 Justice Harlan argued that the Sixth Amendment was
in reality the “linchpin” of the Miranda ruling, and that the concern with
interrogating a suspect who had not spoken to a lawyer relied more on Sixth
Amendment rulings192 like Gideon v. Wainwright.193 The dissent was not off the
mark. The majority in Miranda had emphasized, “[d]enial of counsel to the
indigent at the time of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can
afford one would be no more supportable by reason or logic than the similar
situation at trial and on appeal.”194
Where the Justice Harlan missed the mark was to suggest that the Court was
wrong to focus on the interplay between both constitutional rights. The Sixth

188 Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence, 71 CORNELL L. REV.
57, 62 (2015).
189 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473.
190 Id. at 509 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 510 (“I turn now to the Court’s asserted reliance on the Fifth Amendment, an
approach which I frankly regard as a trompe l’oeil.”).
192 Id. at 513 (“[T]he Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which is
never expressly relied on by the Court but whose judicial precedents turn out to be linchpins
of the confession rules announced . . . .”).
193 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (interpreting the Sixth Amendment to require that indigent
criminal defendants in state court proceedings be provided counsel).
194 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472-73 (first citing Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); then citing
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)); see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 639
n.2 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Even under Miranda, the ‘right to counsel’ exists
solely as a means of protecting the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to
incriminate himself.”).
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Amendment right to counsel is centrally related to the waiver of other rights,
like the Fifth Amendment privilege. A criminal suspect may only be able to
intelligently waive certain rights after consulting with a lawyer.195 The rights are
intersectional, and the result was a new standard—the Miranda right—which
combines a Sixth Amendment concern for a right to counsel and adequate waiver
of that right, with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.196
Later cases developed the contours of that right, in rulings such as Edwards v.
Arizona,197 holding that questioning must cease if the right to counsel is invoked
during custodial questioning, and where the litigated asserted rights under the
“Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments,” but the Court simply noted that
Miranda protects a “right to counsel.”198
We also raise a cautionary lesson regarding formulation of new constitutional
standards addressing multiple constitutional rights. In the wake of Miranda and
Edwards, later cases have also had to work out more complex issues surrounding
the intersection of Sixth Amendment and Fifth Amendment claims, such as
when police initiate questioning after the state automatically appoints counsel.
The Supreme Court has arguably misunderstood the intersectional nature of the
Miranda right and used that right in a way that erodes separate Sixth
Amendment rights.199 The intersectional right should be understood as an
independent constitutional standard; otherwise there is the danger that it can be
misread to influence the interpretation of the underlying protections when
analyzing separate rights.200

195 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (“[T]o permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege
against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his
rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”).
196 Id. at 478-79 (holding certain procedural warnings, including the suspect’s right to
consult with an attorney, are necessary to meaningfully protect the privilege against selfincrimination).
197 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
198 Id. at 478, 485.
199 See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786-87 (2009) (holding that courts need
not presume waivers of the right to counsel during interrogation are invalid, even if counsel
was appointed at arraignment, and rejecting the “wholesale importation of the Edwards rule
into the Sixth Amendment”). Scholars have criticized the Court’s handling of the intersection
of Fifth and Sixth Amendment concerns in that ruling, arguing that Montejo was wrong to
suggest “that the formal waiver procedure established by Miranda and its progeny provides
sufficient protection of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Eda Katherine
Tinto, Wavering on Waiver, Montejo v. Louisiana and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel,
48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (2011).
200 Coenen discusses a type of error termed a “non-counting error,” in which a subsequent
court fails to understand the joint-origins of a precedent upon which it relies. Coenen, supra
note 18, at 1074. This situation involves something still more complex and problematic: error
in the application of a prior precedent involving joint-rights to a context involving only one
of the rights.
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B. Cumulative Rights as Constraints
Conversely, intersectional rights cases can act as a constraint on the unbridled
expansion of rights jurisprudence. Sometimes, the fact that an analysis is
intersectional prevents it from being applied in future cases. For example, some
view the equal protection analysis in cases such as Obergefell as potentially
narrowing the analysis, by making it permissible to deny a good, such as access
to marriage, to all individuals.201 In prior rulings, including Lawrence and
Windsor, the Court did not identify whether a specific tier of scrutiny should
apply, and therefore avoided addressing whether it was protecting LGBT
individuals from discrimination, or instead focusing on the fundamental right to
sexual autonomy or marriage at hand.202
An intersectional analysis may result in a form of constitutional minimalism
under that view. As Karlan observed of M.L.B., the substantive due process
aspect of the opinion “provided the majority with a response to the dissent’s
claim that the decision would open the floodgates to all sorts of litigation-access
claims: the nature of the interest involved, and the severity of the state
impairment of that interest” set the case apart from other civil actions.203 In
contrast, Kenji Yoshino offers a strong reading of Obergefell, suggesting that
the opinion supports a view that the Court did more by reinvigorating the equal
protection and antisubordination aspect of the analysis, making the equal
protection aspect far less of a constraint than in prior cases.204
The presence of an additional potentially applicable right may enhance the
Government’s interest in an area, rather than undercut its asserted interest. The
Government may have compelling state interests in the area of equal protection
law that would not constitute a defense to a due process claim. Or the additional
claim may make additional facts relevant that provide additional support for the
Government’s theory. The Government may also benefit from the ability to rely
on multiple enumerated powers to support federal legislation.205
Outright conflict between rights claims raises still more complex and distinct
issues beyond the scope of this Article. One area that is already becoming an
active arena for challenges to Obergefell involves the assertion of religious
liberty rights in order to challenge same-sex marriage rules; such cases involve
potentially conflicting constitutional rights and questions concerning whether
rules adequately accommodate any conflict.206 The Supreme Court generally
201 See Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 147, 173 (2015) (“[I]n Obergefell, a standard equal protection ruling would have
permitted the states either to level up by granting both same-sex couples and opposite-sex
couples marriage licenses or to level down by refusing to grant licenses to both sets of
couples.”).
202 See id. at 147.
203 Karlan, supra note 18, at 483.
204 Yoshino, supra note 201, at 179.
205 See Coenen, supra note 18, at 1086-88.
206 Carl Tobias, Implementing Marriage Equality in America, 65 DUKE. L.J. ONLINE 25,
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seeks to avoid such conflicts, but the potential conflicts raise analogous
questions regarding whether protections are in fact compatible or incompatible,
and whether government interests weigh differentially across rights.207
V.

REIMAGINING INTERSECTIONAL RIGHTS

Reimagining constitutional claims as intersectional can, we believe, highlight
the shortcomings in some lines of constitutional cases. In the equal protection
setting, the tiers of scrutiny that the Court often ostensibly relies upon are geared
towards handling much the same problem that intersectional rights are designed
to address: the fact that costs of error are higher when there are multiple reasons
to think that a group is being specially targeted, or that the government’s asserted
interests are particularly flimsy. Indeed, an intersectional approach may at times
be more descriptive of what the Court is doing, or what courts should be doing,
than the traditional equal protection tiers of scrutiny, which scholars have
increasingly observed do not function clearly. For example, William Araiza has
described how the Court has relied in recent decisions on congruence and
proportionality tests in examining the government’s interests, rather than using
tiers of scrutiny.208 That type of interest analysis may be more amenable to the
type of cumulative constitutional analysis that we have described, both where
the harm to plaintiffs is mutually reinforcing and where a separate right
undercuts the government’s asserted interest.
As an additional example of how existing jurisprudence could be
reconsidered, take the Court’s abortion jurisprudence. Many scholars over the
years have found Roe v. Wade to be doctrinally unsatisfying.209 Many have been

37-38 (2015).
207 For example, on one view, by not recognizing the fetus as a person, the Court may have
avoided a conflict between substantive due process privacy rights and life interests of a fetus.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). By referring to competing state interests, and not
a competing right, the Court can generally avoid the notion that a right might conflict with
another right. The Court explicitly resolved such a potential conflict in Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532 (1965), ruling that the defendant’s fair trial right to due process trumped the public
First Amendment interest in a public trial, where the trial was televised. Id. at 539; see also
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001) (“[T]hese cases present a conflict between
interests of the highest order—on the one hand, the interest in the full and free dissemination
of information concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual
privacy and, more specifically, in fostering private speech.”). See generally Ofer Raban,
Conflicts of Rights: When the Federal Constitution Restricts Civil Liberties, 64 RUTGERS L.
REV. 381 (2012).
208 See William Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal
Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 370
(2014) (“[T]he Court’s Enforcement Clause jurisprudence has . . . relied heavily on a group’s
suspect class status when determining whether enforcement legislation benefitting that group
satisfies the congruence and proportionality test.”).
209 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973) (offering a series of criticisms of the Court’s opinion in Roe and
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frustrated by the fact that the Court’s focus on privacy appeared to come at the
expense of a focus on equality. The equality argument, that in order to exercise
equal citizenship women need access to abortion, has been popular with
scholars210 and less so with the Court (Justice Ginsburg excepted211).
But perhaps there is a third way, in which the Supreme Court could have relied
cumulatively on both equal protection and due process protections. The result
would have created even more robust protections for women seeking
reproductive autonomy. As David Meyer has observed of Gonzales v.
Carhart,212 in which the Court upheld the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act of
2003,213 the Court “pointedly ignored the equality implications of its
understanding of women’s substantive liberties.”214 Meyer contrasts this
treatment with Lawrence, where the Court did understand that the due process
right to liberty enables equality, and did not choose one theory at the expense of
the other.215
In still other situations, the Supreme Court has outright rejected any
connection between related constitutional rights. In one view, the Court would
be correct to do so if constitutional rights conflict and would each call for
inconsistent analysis. In that situation, there simply is not an intersectional right.
The broadest statement of a principle against intersectionality was in Graham
v. Connor,216 in which the Court stated that where there is an explicit source of
constitutional protection, that provision and not more generalized protection
applies to claims: “[t]he validity of the claim must then be judged by reference

ultimately calling it “bad constitutional law”).
210 See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Equality Arguments for Abortion Rights, 60
U.C.L.A. L. REV. DISC. 160, 163 (2013) (discussing the argument that “abortion restrictions
deprive women of control over the timing of motherhood and so predictably exacerbate the
inequalities in educational, economic, and political life engendered by childbearing and
childrearing”); Reva B. Siegel, Siegel, J., Concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE
SAID 63, 64-65 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005); Robin West, West, J., Concurring in the Judgment,
in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra, at 121, 141-42.
211 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 383 (1985).
212 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
213 Id. at 167-68.
214
David D. Meyer, Gonzalez v. Carhart and the Hazards of Muddled Scrutiny, 17 J.L. &
POL’Y 57, 84, 86 (2008) (noting only Justice Ginsburg’s dissent recognized the case was not
only about “some generalized notion of privacy” but also about women’s “equal citizenship”).
215 Id. at 86 (suggesting Carhart signals a change in substantive due process rights
announced in Lawrence, but not a complete disavowal); see also Deborah Dinner, Recovering
the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 343, 345-46 (2010) (“Today, women’s rights
to sex equality and to reproductive liberty constitute distinct doctrinal categories. The
jurisprudence recognizing a right to privacy in reproductive decision-making does not take
into account the multiple sex equality interests at stake. Equal protection jurisprudence,
likewise, does not address the implications of reproductive liberty for women’s equality.”).
216 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
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to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right, rather than to
some generalized ‘excessive force’ standard.”217 In that case, involving an
allegation of excessive force during a police chase, the Court held that the
analysis should proceed under the Fourth Amendment, and not a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process theory.218 The Court added, “Because the
Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must
be the guide for analyzing these claims.”219 That statement is clearly wrong,
although it reflects the Court’s typical aversion to reaching substantive due
process questions when it is not necessary to do so. The language can be seen as
expressing reluctance to adopt expansive views of substantive due process.220
However, there is no more general principle than that to be found in the Court’s
rulings. The more specific enumerated right is not one that “must” apply at the
expense of another applicable rights provision. We have discussed countless
examples of the Court taking the opposite approach, including, in the criminal
procedure context, by applying Sixth Amendment rights alongside due process
rights, and even permitting ineffective assistance claims as a means to litigate
separate Fourth Amendment claims.221
Yet, the statement cannot be so neatly cabined from still other Fourth
Amendment cases similarly displaying a formalistic desire not to take into
account other potentially compounding constitutional violations. In its decision
in Whren v. United States,222 the Supreme Court famously deemed irrelevant to
its Fourth Amendment analysis whether there was also racial targeting.223 Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court, explained:
We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective
enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. But the
constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth

217

Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.
219 Id.
220 The most dramatic statement of such a view is Justice Scalia’s well-known footnote in
his opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), which argued that substantive
due process claims should be judged based on the “most specific” and narrowly defined
sources in history and tradition. Id. at 127 n.6 (plurality opinion); see also Laurence Tribe &
Michael Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 106566 (1990).
221 See supra Sections I.A-B (discussing cumulative harmless error and cumulative
prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence).
222 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
223 Id. at 814-15. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America
Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States
and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010).
218
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Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.224
The Court was correctly concerned with potentially opening the door to new
breeds of constitutional claims. A “hybrid” claim that would make a separate
equal protection violation relevant, even if there was no Fourth Amendment
violation, would be troubling. However, that passage did not address the
possibility of an intersectional claim. If the officer not only lacked probable
cause, but the plaintiff could show discrimination based on race, the combined
Fourth Amendment and equal protection concerns would provide far greater
cause for a constitutional remedy in a criminal case.
Scholars have criticized the Court’s unwillingness to consider the more
serious harm engendered when police not only potentially violate the Fourth
Amendment, but in a manner that is racially discriminatory.225 Devon Carbado
has explored the “racial insensitivity” of the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings,
and its impact on race-based policing practices.226 A more generous reading of
the reasoning in Whren would be that the Supreme Court was faced with
conflicting constitutional demands, and it could not accommodate the interests
or analysis of both equal protection and Fourth Amendment claims. One claim
called for an examination of discriminatory intent, while the other required an
objective evaluation of the police officer’s probable cause supporting the search.
The Court might have found the intersection too doctrinally difficult to handle.
Yet, the Court could have treated the claims differently while giving each
meaning, using the categories we have described in this Article. First, the Court
could have treated the problem as an aggregated harm, where a separate analysis
and a separate constitutional violation meant that relief was more deserved.
Second, the Court could have treated the problem as intersectional, demanding
greater scrutiny of the probable-cause determination by police due to the
evidence of racial targeting. Instead, the Court disregarded the evidence of race
discrimination.227 The result means that to challenge police conduct as racially
discriminatory one cannot argue that a particular search or seizure was in part

224

Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
Akhil Amar has argued generally that “Fourth Amendment reasonableness” should
trigger heightened concerns when other constitutional violations are also implicated,
including equal protection violations and others. Amar argues that in cases, for example,
involving the search of a newspaper: “What was missing was a way of integrating First
Amendment concerns explicitly into the Fourth Amendment analysis . . . . The First
Amendment lesson can be generalized. For example, searches of attorneys’ offices implicate
special concerns of attorney-client privilege protected by the Sixth Amendment.” AKHIL
AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 35, 37 (1977).
226 See generally Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV.
946, 967-68 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s construction and reification of race in Fourth
Amendment cases legitimizes and reproduces racial inequality in the context of policing.”).
227 Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-13 (refusing to consider the police officer’s ulterior motives in
determining the reasonableness of the search where probable cause otherwise exists).
225
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unreasonable due to racial targeting. Instead, one must target an entire pattern of
selective enforcement in a civil case, which can require data that is prohibitively
difficult to obtain, and where the remedy would be of little use to a defendant
who primarily seeks to avoid conviction based on an unconstitutional search and
seizure.228 The case, therefore, raises a different selective enforcement concern:
that the Court selectively recognizes cumulative constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
Aggregation of constitutional rights is a pervasive feature of constitutional
litigation. Litigants would not neglect to include an additional or alternative
constitutional theory in a complaint. Nor should judges be reluctant to consider
the additional impact of an additional constitutional right on the analysis. To be
sure, for many rights, the interpretive analysis is correctly contained within a
single provision. We do not mean to downplay in any way the concerns with
misuse of cumulative constitutional analysis, including concerns with textual
fidelity, judicial restraint, avoiding undue doctrinal complexity, and other
questions of compatibility with models of constitutional interpretation and
judicial review.229 However, where multiple constitutional provisions do apply,
it is not necessarily salutary judicial restraint to treat each constitutional right as
an island unto itself. Indeed, there are real perils to ignoring a second
constitutional dimension to a problem. Real incoherence in constitutional
doctrine can flow from ignoring that a due process problem is accompanied by
discriminatory treatment in violation of equal protection, or that a violation of a
right is compounded by arbitrary treatment in violation of due process.
We have also highlighted how even in the situations in which a court
recognizes that more than one constitutional right applies, it is not enough to
simply note the fact when granting relief. Doing so provides poor guidance to
litigants and judges. Courts should provide particular guidance on how the
presence of more than one potential constitutional violation affects the analysis.
At times, that may mean noting that the analysis is unchanged regardless of
which harms are implicated in a given case. Or, it may mean explaining in detail
how the presence of more than one violation changes the factors to be considered
regarding the harm to the plaintiff, or in negating an asserted government
interest.
Thus, we reject the “sui generis” critique of the Supreme Court’s rulings in
cases such as Lawrence and Windsor and Obergefell. It may not be possible to
anticipate how rights will interact in cases going forward. That may not be a
228 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 459, 470 (1996); Johnson, supra note at 223,
at 1064 (“The inability to exclude the fruits of a stop based on impermissible factors under
the Equal Protection Clause make any such claim of limited utility to criminal defendants like
Whren and Brown, who wanted to avoid conviction and imprisonment, not to recover
damages in a civil action . . . .”).
229 For an extended treatment of criticism of cumulative or combination constitutional
analysis, see generally Coenen, supra note 18.
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weakness of the approach, if by considering multiple constitutional sources the
rulings comprehensively address the entire constitutional harm, rather than
vacillating between addressing one constitutional dimension and another.
Simply citing to multiple constitutional sources is not enough, however. Courts
should explain what they mean and in doing so they will hopefully avoid the
problems raised in the “hybrid rights” situations, in which on closer
examination, the notion that two separate non-violations could create a violation
does not hold water.
Instead, the three types of cumulative analysis should be specified and should
motivate careful constitutional analysis. We contend that when considering
cases involving the first category, aggregated harm, courts should be open to
hearing evidence of multiple acts because many instances of constitutional harm
occur in the form of “death by a thousand cuts” rather than a single blow. In the
second type, hybrid rights, we argue that multiple constitutional violations might
alert a court to particularly troubling behavior (because they constitute an
aggregated harm or undercut the government’s interest), but that two half
violations do not make a whole: the court needs to actually find a violation of at
least one constitutional right in order to grant relief. Finally, as to intersectional
rights, we agree that rights addressing closely related harms can be viewed as
mutually reinforcing, as for example, equal protection and due process
violations can be.
Critics of Obergefell, together with the dissenters, are right to raise the
concern that without identifying the level of scrutiny, or how it matters that both
due process and equality concerns are implicated, the ruling does not provide
guidance to lower courts, and it raises the risk that two non-violations could
somewhat add up to a violation. However, they overstate their case to suggest
that there is anything problematic about jointly analyzing two closely related, if
not intertwined and mutually reinforcing, constitutional violations. Obergefell
highlights the continuing vitality of fundamental rights equal protection
doctrine, but it is no outlier; any number of the most commonly litigated
constitutional theories involve cumulative theories, particularly intersectional
rights. We have also argued that aggregate harm is underused in cases, including
in criminal cases, where the doctrine exists for the good reason that a fair trial
can be undermined by multiple violations.
Raising two separate but compatible constitutional violations is not “having
it both ways,” or ignoring some necessary decision or trade-off between
asserting one constitutional harm versus another. Rather, as the Supreme Court
recognized in Obergefell, there can be a “synergy” between separate
constitutional provisions.230 Sometimes the result is considered as a new right,
requiring a distinct analysis informed by two constitutional sources, as under our
intersectional category. Sometimes the judge should offer relief where the
violations would not independently require a remedy, but where the additive
harm or weakened government interest demands relief. Formally cabining
230

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
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analysis to one “claim” at the expense of larger constitutional purposes across
provisions can lead to incoherent and incorrect rulings. When courts cumulate
constitutional rights, though, they should be clear about what interests are
mutually reinforcing or not, why, and how this affects the analysis or the
scrutiny. Cumulative constitutional rights doctrine has long been at the core of
constitutional interpretation and if conducted properly, analyzing the mutually
reinforcing provisions of the constitution can give greater meaning to the
Constitution as a whole.

